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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
SCOTT H. LEE, an individual, DRUG 
TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, VURV, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
BOW. and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a 
married couple, 
Defendants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44791 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
JAMES F. JACOBSON 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
HONORABLE D. DUFF McKEE 
MICHELLE R. POINTS 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUl.\1MARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-13887 
David Johnson, Tessa Cousins 
vs. 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
Location: Ada County District Court 
Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel 
David Crossett, Scott H Lee, Drug Testing Compliance 
Group Lie, Unknown Vurv Lie, Bow Schmelling, Krystal 
Schmelling 
DATE 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
DATE 
08/10/2015 
08/10/2015 
08/10/2015 
08/20/2015 
Current Case Assignment 
Case Number 
Court 
Date Assigned 
Judicial Officer 
Cousins, Tessa 
Johnson, David 
Crossett, David 
CASE INFORMATION 
CASE ASSIGNl\lENT 
CV-OC-2015-13887 
Ada County District Court 
08/10/2015 
Hoagland, Samuel 
PARTY INFOR!\fA TION 
Drug Testing Compliance Group Lie 
Lee, ScottH 
Schmelling, Bow 
Schmelling, Krystal 
Vurv Lie 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT 
New Case Filed Other Claims 
New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Complaint Filed 
Complaint Filed 
Summons Filed 
Summons Filed 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service 
PAGE 1 OF 8 
Filed on: 08/10/2015 
AA- All Initial District Court 
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and HI) 
Lead Attorneys 
Jacobson, James Frederick 
Retained 
208-884-1995(W) 
McCubbins, James Stewart 
Neal 
Retained 
208-908-4415 x5366(W) 
Points, Michelle Renae 
Retained 
208-287-3216(W) 
Points, Michelle Renae 
Retained 
208-287-3216(W) 
Points, Michelle Renae 
Retained 
208-287-32 l 6(W) 
INDEX 
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08/20/2015 
08/20/2015 
08/24/2015 
08/25/2015 
08/25/2015 
09/08/2015 
09/09/2015 
09/14/2015 
09/14/2015 
09/15/2015 
09/18/2015 
09/23/2015 
10/14/2015 
10/14/2015 
10/20/2015 
11/13/2015 
11/13/2015 
11/19/2015 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-13887 
Answer 
Answer (Points/or Crossett) 
Motion to Disqualify 
Motion To Disqualify Counsel 
Affidavit of Service 
Affidavit Of Service 8.12.15 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/15/2015 04:00 PM) to disqualify counsel 
Objection 
Objection to Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Request for Attorneys Fees 
Objection 
Objection to Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Request for Attorenys Fees 
Notice 
Notice O/Vacating Hearing 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 09/15/2015 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated to disqualify 
counsel 
CANCELED Motion Hearing (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Vacated 
to disqualify counsel Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 09/15/2015 04:00 PM· Hearing 
Vacated 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Answers to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests 
for Production and Requests for Admission to Plaintiff 
Request 
Request For Trial Setting 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 11/13/2015 03:00 PM) 
Notice 
Notice o/Scheduling Conference 
Notice of Service 
Notice Of Service of Discovery 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Hearing result/or Scheduling Conference scheduled on 11/13/2015 03:00 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Scheduling Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Notice of Service 
Notice O/Service 
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02/26/2016 
02/26/2016 
02/26/2016 
03/01/2016 
03/03/2016 
03/03/2016 
03/03/2016 
03/03/2016 
03/04/2016 
03/08/2016 
03/11/2016 
03/11/2016 
03/17/2016 
04/08/2016 
04/08/2016 
04/27/2016 
05/02/2016 
05/04/2016 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-13887 
Opposition to 
Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Compel 
Opposition to 
Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate 
Opposition to 
Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Leave To File An Amended Compliant 
Notice 
Notice of Filing Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Consolidate 
Reply 
Reply to Defendants Memorandum in Opposition of Plaintiffs Motion/or Leave to File an 
Amended Complaint 
Reply 
Reply to David Crossetts Memorandum in Opposition of Motion to Consolidate 
Reply 
Reply to Scott Lees Memorandum in Opposition of Motion to Consolidate 
Reply 
Reply to Defendants Memorandum Opposition of Motion to Compel 
Notice 
Notice of Attending Hearing Telephonically 
Hearing Scheduled (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Consolidate, Compel Discovery, And Amend Complaint And Join Party Hearing result for 
Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 03/08/2016 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Stipulation 
Stipulation for Scheduling 
Order 
Order Setting Trial, Pre-Trial Conference, and Scheduling Deadlines 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Hearing result/or Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 03/08/2016 03:00 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Amended 
First Amended Complaint 
Summons Filed 
(4) Summons 
Stipulation 
Stipulation for Order of Dismissal With Prejudice, Bo Wand Krystal Schmelling 
Order 
Order on Motions 
CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Vacated 
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05/16/2016 
05/16/2016 
06/23/2016 
07/08/2016 
07/08/2016 
07/18/2016 
07/18/2016 
07/18/2016 
07/19/2016 
09/06/2016 
09/12/2016 
09/12/2016 
09/19/2016 
09/23/2016 
09/23/2016 
09/23/2016 
09/23/2016 
09/30/2016 
09/30/2016 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-13887 
CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Vacated 
CANCELED Status Conference (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Vacated 
Notice 
Amended Notice of Deposition of David Crossett 
Amended 
Amended Notice of Deposition of David Crossett 
Stipulation 
Stipulation for Entry of a Protective Order 
Miscellaneous 
Lay Witness Disclosure 
PO Protection Order Granted 
Protective Order 
Answer 
Answer To First Amended Complaint (Points For David, Drug Testing Compliance Group, 
and Vurv) 
Affidavit of Service 
Affidavit Of Service 6.1.16 
~Motion 
inLimine 
mMotion 
For Bifurcated Trial 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
Motion In Limine (9/30/16 @3 p.m) 
~ Notice of Service 
of Discovery Responses 
~ Pretrial Memorandum 
ffl Memorandum 
In Opposition Of Defendants' Motion For Bifurcate Trial 
~ Memorandum 
in Opposition of Defendant Crossett's Motion in Limine 
ffl Pretrial Memorandum 
Plaintiffs 
Pre-trial Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Motion In Limine And Motion To Bifurcate 
~ Witness and Exhibit List 
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09/30/2016 
09/30/2016 
10/05/2016 
10/11/2016 
10/11/2016 
10/15/2016 
10/17/2016 
10/17/2016 
10/17/2016 
10/18/2016 
10/18/2016 
10/18/2016 
11/01/2016 
11/02/2016 
11/08/2016 
11/08/2016 
11/22/2016 
11/23/2016 
11/23/2016 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-13887 
Defendant Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC And VURV 
m Court Minutes 
~ Witness List 
Plaintiffs' Witness and Exhibit List 
m Pretrial Order 
Memorandum and Order 
~ Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
ffl Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law 
ffl Exhibit List/Log 
Defendants' Trial Exhibit List 
Status Conference (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: McKee, D. Duft) 
Court Trial - Civil (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: McKee, D. Duft) 
ffl Court Minutes 
Court Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: McKee, D. Duff) 
ffl Court Minutes 
ffl Exhibit List/Log 
ffl Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Directions for Entry of Judgment 
Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Party (Crossett, David; Drug Testing Compliance Group Lie) 
ffl Declaration 
Of Counsel Setting Forth Attorney Fees And Costs 
fflNotice of Hearing 
(12/9/16 at 2pm) 
ffl Objection 
to Defendants' Request for Attorney Fees 
ffl Affidavit 
of David Johnson in Support of Motion for New Trial 
ffl Affidavit 
of James F. Jacobson in Support of Motion for New Trial 
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I 1/23/2016 
I 1/23/2016 
11/23/2016 
12/01/2016 
12/01/2016 
12/01/2016 
12/09/2016 
12/16/2016 
12/21/2016 
12/21/2016 
01/27/2017 
01/27/2017 
02/03/2017 
02/08/2017 
03/07/2017 
DATE 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-13887 
fflMotion 
for New Trial 
ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion 
for New Trial 
fflNotice of Hearing 
on Motion/or New Trial (12/09/16@2pm) 
fflReply 
to Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion/or Attorney Fees 
ffl Response 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion/or New Trial 
ffl Declaration 
Supplement Declaration of Counsel Setting Forth Attorney Fees and Costs 
Motion Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland. Samuel) 
ffl Decision or Opinion 
Ruling on Objection to Defendant's Application/or Attorney Fees 
fflJudgment 
ffl Miscellaneous 
Attorney Fee Lien 
ffl Notice of Appeal 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
fflMotion 
for Posting of Security Pending Appeal 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
Schedualed (3/7/17@3 p.m.) 
Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
For Posting Of Security Pending Appeal 
Defendant Crossett, David 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 3/2/2017 
Other Party Unknown Payor 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 3/2/2017 
Plaintiff Johnson, David 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
FINANCIAL INFORMATJO:\' 
PAGE 70F 8 
136.00 
136.00 
0.00 
16.00 
16.00 
0.00 
353.00 
353.00 
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUl\IMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2015-13887 
Balance Due as of 3/2/2017 
PAGE80F8 
0.00 
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James F. Jacobson [ISB No. 7011] 
James S. Neal McCubbins [ISB No. 9463] 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID 83714 
Telephone: (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile: (208) 477-5210 
Email: james@jjlawidaho.com 
Email: mccubbins@jjlawidaho.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
• 
NO. ___ ~:tjfj~ = 
A.M 
AUG 1 0 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. FUCH, Cler!< 
1,y iTEPHAI\IIE VIDAK 
DEf'L'TY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, 
Defendant. 
1513887 
CASENO. CV oc 
COMPLAINT 
Filing Fee: $221.00 
A.A. 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, in 
the above matter, by and through its counsel of record, Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC, and 
for its cause of action under Idaho Code Section 30-25-801 against the above-named 
Defendant, states and alleges as follows: 
COMPLAINT - Page 1 
000011
• 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to I. C. § 1-705 and I. C. 
§5-514. The amount in controversy is in excess of jurisdictional minimum of this Court 
of$10,000. 
2. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to I.C. § 5-404. 
PARTIES 
3. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff, David Johnson, is and was a resident of the 
Ada County, state of Idaho. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant, David Crossett, is and was a resident of 
the Ada County, state ofldaho. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. In or about May of 2013, Plaintiff and Defendant began discussions on 
developing a drug testing compliance business for Commercial Drivers License holders 
seeking compliance with Department of Transportation rules and regulations. 
6. On or about_ of 2013, Plaintiff provided investment monies of $3,000 to get 
the business up and running. 
7. On or about June 5, 2013, Defendant filed, on behalf of the business that Plaintiff 
and Defendant had formed, articles of organization for an Idaho limited liability 
company, listing himself as a Member or Manager and as the registered agent. The 
limited liability company was named "Drug Testing Compliance Group, 
LLC" (hereinafter "DTC Group"). 
8. Plaintiff was of the understanding that Defendant was to be the Manager, 
COMPLAINT - Page 2 
000012
• 
Presfdent, or Chief Executive Officer of the DTC Group. 
/ 
9. On or about June 13, 2013, Plaintiff retained the services of James F. Jacobson of 
the firm Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC to draft an operating agreement for DTC Group. At 
all times relevant to the formation of DTC Group and the development of the operating 
agreement, Defendant considered Plaintiff and Tessa Cousins members of OTC Group. 
10. On or about July 12, 2013, Defendant identified the membership interests of 
David Johnson at forty-four percent ( 44%) with a cash infusion of $3,000, the 
membership interest of Defendant at forty-six percent (46%) for management services 
and $1,000 cash, and the membership of Tessa Cousins at ten percent (10%) for 
formation and management activities when editing the draft version of the operating 
agreement provided by James F. Jacobson of the firm Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC. 
11. On or about July 12, 2013, Defendant identified that Plaintiff's Position with DTC 
Group would be "Vice President." 
12. On or about July 12, 2013, Defendant and DTC Group were sued by a competitor 
company, CDL Compliance Testing, LLC. 
13. Based upon information and belief, during that lawsuit, Defendant did not want to 
disclose all individuals involved in DTC Group, and, therefore, did not sign the Operating 
Agreement for DTC Group. At all times during the litigation, Defendant avoided 
identifying the actual members of DTC Group. 
14. At no point during the lifetime of DTC Group, did Defendant as Manager or 
President of OTC Group cause proper tax documentation to be sent to Plaintiff 
representing his interest in DTC Group. 
COMPLAINT- Page 3 
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~5: In or about the end of September of 2014, Defendant unilaterally removed both 
/ 
Plaintiff and Tessa Cousins from DTC Group, wrongfully claiming that by virtue of his 
"majority interest" he could unilaterally remove them. 
16. In or about September 2014, Defendant wrongfully "gave" Plaintiff's and Tessa 
Cousins' interest to himself and/or to Scott Lee, a third party consultant brought in by 
Defendant to increase DTC Group Sales. 
17. On or about November 3, 2014, Defendant fom1ed Verve, LLC and TruGuard, 
LLC, and on or about November 7, 2014 renamed the Verve, LLC entity as Vurv, LLC 
and added Scott Lee as a member or manager to the organization. TruGuard, LLC 
already had Scott Lee named as a member or manager. 
18. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that all business opportunities 
that should be going to DTC Group have been wrongfully diverted to either Vurv, LLC or 
TruGuard, LLC, or both. 
COUNT I - DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - EXISTENCE OF LLC 
19. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 18 as if fully set forth herein. 
20. Idaho law does not require that all members of an LLC be listed in its 
organizational documents, nor is the organizational filing with the Idaho Secretary of 
State conclusive as to all Members of an LLC. 
21. At all times since the organization of DTC Group, Plaintiff was and is a member 
of DTC Group. 
22. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that he is a Member of the DTC Group limited 
COMPLAINT- Page 4 
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~· 
. -
liabiiity company. 
COUNT II - DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - INTEREST IN LLC 
23. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 22 as if fully set forth herein. 
24. Idaho Law recognizes the existence of Oral Operating Agreements. (See Estate of 
E.A. Collins v. Geist, 153 P.3d 1167 (Idaho 2007)) 
25. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that absent a signed operating agreement his 
interest was forty-four percent ( 44%) of DTC Group, as identified by Plaintiff in or about 
July of 2013. 
26. In the alternative, Plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that he is an equal interest 
Member with Defendant in DTC Group. 
COUNT III - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES - LOYALTY 
27. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 26 as if fully set forth herein. 
28. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has breached 
his duty of loyalty to Plaintiff by failing to account to Plaintiff regarding the property, 
profit, and benefit derived by its members, including: 
A. Failure to properly distribute income and distributions properly; 
B. Appropriating and/or subverting company opportunities to other businesses 
owned by Defendant; 
C. Dealing with the Company and its other members in conduct as or on behalf of 
a person not a member of the company; 
D. Competing with the Company by diverting all business to Vurv, LLC or 
COMPLAINT- Page 5 
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T Guard, LLC, or both. 
29. Plaintiff has, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT IV - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES - CARE 
30. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 29 as if fully set forth herein. 
31. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has breached 
his duty of care by engaging in willful and intentional misconduct to attempt to force 
Plaintiff and Tessa Cousins out of DTC Group. 
32. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant 
knowingly violated law by failing to provide proper tax documentation and statements to 
Plaintiff. 
33. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant has knowingly failed in his obligations as 
Manager of DTC Group to properly hold meetings, provide notice of meetings, keep 
records, or other governance requirements, and that such actions constitutes grossly 
negligent conduct, and/or willful or intentional misconduct in Defendant's management 
of DTC Group. 
34. Plaintiff has, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT V - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES - GOOD FAITH/FAIR DEALING 
35. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 34 as if fully set forth herein. 
36. Defendant, through his actions, breached his duties and obligations owed to 
Plaintiff and other Members of DTC Group by failing to execute his obligations created 
COMPLAINT - Page 6 
000016
/ 
r 
either by statute of Idaho Law or by the oral operating agreement, consistent with the 
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 
3 7. Plaintiff has, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VI - IMPROPER DISTRIBUTIONS 
38. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 37 as if fully set forth herein. 
39. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has provided 
distributions to himself and others in violation of Idaho Code 30-25-406, and in violation 
of the oral operating agreement. 
40. Plaintiff has, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VII - IMPROPER TERMINATION/EXPULSION OF MEMBER 
41. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 40 as if fully set forth herein. 
42. Defendant's actions in attempting to remove both Plaintiff and Tessa Cousins 
from DTC Group based upon his "majority interest" constitutes an improper termination 
and/or expulsion of members. 
43. Plaintiff has, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VIII - REMOVAL OF DEFENDANT AS MEMBER 
44. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 43 as if fully set forth herein. 
45. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is engaging in 
wrongful conduct that has affected adversely and materially the company's activities and 
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affairs. 
46. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has willfully 
and persistently committed material breach of the oral operating agreement or a duty or 
obligation under section 30-25-409 of the Idaho Code. 
4 7. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has engaged 
and is engaging in conduct relating to the company's activities and affairs which makes it 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the activities and affairs with Defendant as a 
member. 
48. Plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to relief under Section 30-25-601(6) to have a 
judicial order expelling Defendant as a member of DTC Group. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. That the Court adjudge and decree that DTC Group is a three-member LLC existing 
under the laws of Idaho; 
2. That the Court adjudge and decree that Plaintiff is a Member of DTC Group, with an 
interest of forty-four percent (44%) or in the alterantive, an interest of thirty-three 
percent (33%); 
3. That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendant has breached his fiduciary duty of 
loyalty; 
4. That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendant has breached his fiduciary duty of 
care; 
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5. That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendant has breached his fiduciary duty of 
good faith and fair dealing; 
6. That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendant has engaged in the conduct 
complained herein and/or proven at trial, and is liable to Plaintiff for that conduct; 
7. That Plaintiff be awarded actual damages, compensatory damages, special damages, 
punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and any and all other remedies as determined by the 
Court in an amount to be proven at trial; 
8. That Defendant be enjoined from further wrongful and acts as set forth herein and as 
shall be proven at trial, including but not limited to preventing Plaintiff from having 
access to business records; 
9. That Defendant be expelled from DTC Group, LLC, forthwith, and control returned to 
the remaining members, pursuant to 30-25-602(6); 
10. That Plaintiffs recover from Defendant their costs, including reasonable attorney fees, 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. and any other applicable rules, statutes, or provisions of Idaho 
law, and a reasonable attorney fee in the amount of $8,000 in the event of default; and, 
11. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
-rt.. 
DATED this /() - day of August, 2015. 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for David Crossett 
-NO·---~~~----ll'ILf;D /J,,C A.M. _____ P.M .. ~vf7'-l-l"'J"4--
AU6 2 0 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RiCH, Clerk 
By TENU.E GRANT 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1513887 
ANSWER 
Defendant David Crossett, by and through his counsel of record Michelle R. Points of 
Points Law, PLLC, and by way of answer to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff David Johnson, 
admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
1. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Complaint 
as those allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the 
Complaint. 
3. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 6 of the Complaint. 
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4. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint; 
Plaintiff did not "form" DTC Group. 
5. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 8 of the Complaint based 
upon a lack of knowledge. 
6. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of the 
Complaint, as stated. 
7. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraph 12 of the Complaint. 
8. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the 
Complaint. 
9. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraph 17 of the Complaint. 
10. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 18 of the Complaint. 
11. With respect to paragraph 19, Defendant reasserts all admissions and denials 
previously set forth. 
12. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 20 of the Complaint as 
those allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
13. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the 
Complaint. 
14. With respect to paragraph 23, Defendant reasserts all admissions and denials 
previously set forth. 
15. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 of the 
Complaint. 
16. With respect to paragraph 27, Defendant reasserts all admissions and denials 
previously set forth. 
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17. Defendant denies the allegations set forth m paragraphs 28 and 29 of the 
Complaint. 
18. With respect to paragraph 30, Defendant reasserts all admissions and denials 
previously set forth. 
19. Defendant denies paragraphs 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the Complaint. 
20. With respect to paragraph 35, Defendant reasserts all admissions and denials 
previously set forth. 
21. Defendant denies the allegations set forth m paragraphs 36 and 37 of the 
Complaint. 
22. With respect to paragraph 3 8, Defendant reasserts all admissions and denials 
previously set forth. 
23. Defendant denies the allegations set forth m paragraphs 39 and 40 of the 
Complaint. 
24. With respect to paragraph 41, Defendant reasserts all admissions and denials 
previously set forth. 
25. Defendant denies the allegations set forth m paragraphs 42 and 43 of the 
Complaint. 
26. With respect to paragraph 44, Defendant reasserts all admissions and denials 
previously set forth. 
27. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 45, 46, 47 and 48 of the 
Complaint. 
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation 
of Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and 
all of Plaintiffs claims for relief. In addition, Defendant, in asserting the following defenses, 
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is 
upon Defendant but, to the contrary, assert that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant 
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses 
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is 
upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility 
or liability of Defendant, but, to the contrary, specifically deny any and all allegations of 
responsibility and liability in the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action based on the equitable theories of laches, 
waiver and estoppel. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims set forth in the Complaint. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant by reason of Plaintiffs 
release of claims, if any, upon which this action is based as against Defendant. 
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Plaintiff, by 
failing to act reasonably, has failed to mitigate the damages to which Plaintiff may have been 
entitled, if any. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff should be denied any equitable relief herein on the ground of unclean hands. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims contained in Plaintiffs Complaint are frivolous and the Complaint fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
RULE 11 STATEMENT 
Defendant has considered and believes that he may have additional defenses, but does not 
have enough information at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule 11 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant does not intend to waive any such defenses and 
specifically asserts his intention to amend this Answer if, pending research after discovery, facts 
come to light giving rise to such additional defenses. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain the law firm of Points Law, PLLC, to defend him 
in this litigation. Defendants should be awarded their attorney fees and costs incurred in said 
defense pursuant to the parties' contract, I.C. § 12-120 (3) and other applicable law. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for entry of judgment, as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiff take nothing thereby; 
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2. That Defendant be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily 
incurred in defending this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deerris just and proper. 
DA TED this 20th day of August, 2015 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
e R. Points 
y for David Crossett 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of August, 2015, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER by the method indicated below and addressed to each of the 
following: 
James F. Jacobson 
James S. Neal McCubbins 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, Idaho 83714 
ANSWER 
__ U. S Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
~,,.Overnight Mail 
~-- F :ax (208) 477-5210 
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James S. Neal McCubbins [ISB No. 9463] 
James F. Jacobson [ISB No. 7011] 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID 83 714 
Telephone: (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile: (208) 477-5210 
Email: mccubbins@jjlawidaho.com 
Email: james@jjlawidaho.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
......_....._ NO. FILE.~ J2P1/ 
.... A.M. ____ _., 
APR O 8 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DA YID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BOW. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married 
couple, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV OC 1513887 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiffs, DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, 
and TESSA COUSINS, an individual in the above matter, by and through their counsel of 
record, Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC, and for their causes of action against the above-
named Defendants, state and alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
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1. This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to LC. § 1-705 and LC. §5-
514. The amount in controversy is in excess of jurisdictional minimum of this Court of 
$10,000. 
2. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to LC. § 5-404. 
PARTIES 
3. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff, David Johnson, is and was a resident of the 
Ada County, State ofldaho. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff, Tessa Cousins, is and was a resident of the 
Ada County, State ofldaho. 
5. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant, David Crossett, is and was a resident of 
the Ada County, State ofldaho. 
6. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant, Scott Lee, is and was a resident of the 
Ada County, State of Idaho. 
7. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC 
(hereinafter "DTC Group"), was and Idaho limited liability company doing business in 
the state of Idaho. 
8. At all times relevant hereto, Vurv, LLC (hereinafter "Vurv"), was and Idaho 
limited liability company doing business in the state of Idaho. 
9. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants, Bo W. and Krystal Schmelling (the 
"Defendants Schmelling"), are and were residents of the Ada County, State ofldaho. 
10. Plaintiffs David Johnson and Tessa Cousins are referred herein as each a 
"Plaintiff' and together the "Plaintiffs." 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
11. In or about May of 2013, Plaintiffs and Defendant Crossett began discussions on 
developing a drug testing compliance business for Commercial Driver's License holders 
seeking compliance with Department of Transportation rules and regulations. 
12. On or about May of 2013, Plaintiff Johnson provided investment monies of at 
least $3,000 to get the business up and running. 
13. Beginning on or around May of 2013, Plaintiff Cousins provided knowledge and 
subject matter expertise, as well as functioned as an administrator of the business DTC 
Group. 
14. On or about June 5, 2013, Defendant filed, on behalf of the business that Plaintiffs 
and Defendant Crossett had formed, articles of organization for an Idaho limited liability 
company, listing himself as a Member or Manager and as the registered agent. The 
limited liability company was named "Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC." 
15. Plaintiffs were of the understanding that Defendant Crossett was to be the 
Manager, President, or Chief Executive Officer of the DTC Group and that Plaintiff 
Cousins was to act as an executive within DTC Group. 
16. On or about June 13, 2013, Plaintiff Johnson retained the services of James F. 
Jacobson, of the firm Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC, to review and edit an operating 
agreement for DTC Group that was provided to the Plaintiffs by Defendant Crossett. At 
all times relevant to the formation of DTC Group and the development of the operating 
agreement, Defendant Crossett considered Plaintiffs members of DTC Group, and/or that 
Plaintiff Cousins would become a member through her involvement. 
17. On or about July 12, 2013, Defendant Crossett identified the membership interests 
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of Plaintiff Johnson at forty-four percent (44%) with a cash infusion of $3,000, the 
membership interest of Defendant Crossett at forty-six percent ( 46%) for management 
services and $1,000 cash, and the membership of Tessa Cousins at ten percent (10%) for 
formation and management activities when editing the draft version of the operating 
agreement provided by James F. Jacobson of the firm Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC. 
18. On or about July 12, 2013, Defendant Crossett identified that Plaintiff's Position 
with DTC Group would be "Vice President." 
19. On or about July 12, 2013, Defendant Crossett and DTC Group were sued by a 
competitor company, CDL Compliance Testing, LLC. 
20. Based upon information and belief, during that lawsuit, Defendant Crossett did 
not want to disclose all individuals involved in DTC Group, and, therefore, did not sign 
the Operating Agreement for DTC Group. 
21. Based upon information and belief, at all times during the litigation, Defendant 
Crossett attempted avoided identifying the actual members of DTC Group, and only 
identified Plaintiff Johnson to Plaintiff Cousins before or during the course of a 
deposition regarding the lawsuit. 
22. At no point during the lifetime of DTC Group, did Defendant as Manager or 
President of DTC Group cause proper tax documentation to be sent to Plaintiffs 
representing their interest in DTC Group. 
23. In or about August of 2014, Defendant Crossett informed Plaintiff Cousins that he 
was having or had had a business meeting with Defendant Lee regarding the sale of a 
business owned entirely by Defendant Crossett called "Ready Receipts." Defendant 
Crossett further indicated to Plaintiff Cousins that such meeting had nothing to do with 
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DTC Group. 
24. In or about August of 2014, Defendant Crossett unilaterally entered into an 
agreement with Defendant Lee to provide sales and marketing services for DTC Group in 
exchange for ownership in DTC Group. 
25. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that the terms of the 
agreement were such that Defendants Crossett and Lee agreed that if DTC Group could 
double sales within ninety (90) days, Defendant Crossett would grant Defendant Lee a 
fifty percent (50%) ownership interest in DTC Group, contrary to law. 
26. In or about the end of September of 2014, Defendant unilaterally removed both 
Plaintiffs from DTC Group as members, wrongfully claiming that by virtue of his 
"majority interest" of forty-six percent ( 46%) he could unilaterally remove them. 
27. In or about September 2014, Defendant Crossett wrongfully "gave" Plaintiffs' 
interest to himself and/or to Defendant Scott Lee, a third party consultant brought in by 
Defendant to increase DTC Group Sales, without proper payment and agreement with 
Plaintiffs. 
28. Defendant Lee began working with DTC Group and became aware of the ten 
percent ( 10%) ownership interest of Plaintiff Cousins. 
29. On or before November of 2014, Defendant Lee was aware of the ownership 
interest that Plaintiff Cousins had in DTC Group and offered to buy her interest from her. 
30. On or about November 3, 2014, Defendants Crossett and Lee formed Verve, LLC 
and TruGuard, LLC, and on or about November 7, 2014 renamed the Verve, LLC entity 
as Vurv, LLC and added Scott Lee as a member or manager to the organization. 
TruGuard, LLC already had Scott Lee named as a member or manager. 
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31. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that all business opportunities 
that should be going to OTC Group have been wrongfully diverted to either Vurv, LLC 
or TruGuard, LLC, or both, without the authorization of Plaintiffs. 
32. On or after November 7, 2014, Defendant Crossett repeatedly and consistently 
introduced Defendant Lee to customers, vendors, employees and other business 
associates as an equal owner in DTC Group. 
33. Compensation for Defendant Lee for work performed on behalf of DTC Group 
was provided through monies allocated or funneled through Defendant Vurv by 
Defendants Crossett and Lee without the Plaintiffs' authorization. 
34. On or about November 6, 2015, Defendant Crossett met with Defendant Bo 
Schmelling to discuss the sale of DTC Group to the Defendants Schmelling without prior 
authorization of the Plaintiffs. 
35. Based upon information and belief, on or about December 10, 2015, Defendant 
Crossett unilaterally entered into an agreement to sell and transfer the assets, operations, 
and business of DTC Group to Defendants Schmelling. 
COUNT I-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-EXISTENCE OF LLC 
36. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 - 35 as if fully set forth herein. 
37. Idaho law does not require that all members of an LLC be listed in its 
organizational documents, nor is the organizational filing with the Idaho Secretary of 
State conclusive as to all Members of an LLC. 
38. At all times since the organization of DTC Group, Plaintiffs were and are 
members of DTC Group by virtue of their intention to carry on business with Defendant 
Crossett, and the filing of the articles of organization under Idaho law to operate their 
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business as a limited liability company and not as a general partnership. 
39. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that they are Members of the DTC Group 
limited liability company, and that no other persons or entities other than Plaintiffs and 
Defendant Crossett were and are Members. 
COUNT II - DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - INTEREST IN LLC 
40. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 - 39 as if fully set forth herein. 
41. Idaho Law recognizes the existence of Oral Operating Agreements. (See Estate of 
E.A. Collins v. Geist, 153 P.3d 1167 (Idaho 2007)) 
42. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that absent a signed operating agreement, 
their interest was forty-four percent ( 44 % ) for Plaintiff Johnson and ten percent ( 10%) for 
Plaintiff Cousins of DTC Group, as identified by Defendant Crossett in or about July of 
2013. 
43. In the alternative, Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that they are equal interest 
Members with Defendant Crossett in OTC Group. 
COUNT III - DECLARATORY JUDGMENT -
UNAUTHORIZED COMPANY ACTION 
44. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
45. An actionable, justiciable controversy exists between the Plaintiffs and 
Defendants regarding the purported transfer of interest to i) Defendant Lee, and ii) the 
subsequent transfer of assets to Defendants Schmelling. These acts were not authorized 
pursuant to law or agreement by the Plaintiffs in this action, and therefore unauthorized. 
46. Plaintiffs, together, comprise a fifty-five (55%) intere~t in the ownership of DTC 
Group, and as majority owners and members have the right to input and voting on the 
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sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the company, particularly where Defendant 
Crossett purports to transfer interest and assets either to himself or to others. 
47. Defendant Crossett's and Defendant DTC Group's attempted or actual sale or 
transfer of interest to either Defendant Lee or to Defendant Vurv or to Defendants 
Schmelling or to any other buyers without the prior authorization of the Plaintiffs 
constitutes unauthorized company action by Defendant Crossett acting for himself or as 
an officer and member of Defendant DTC Group, pursuant to Idaho Code §30-25-
407( c )(3)(A). 
48. Upon information and belief, Defendants Schmelling were made aware of the 
ownership interest in Defendant DTC Group of parties other than Defendant Crossett, 
and that Defendant Crossett did not have actual or apparent authority to transact such 
exchange. 
49. Upon information and belief, Defendant Lee had actual awareness and knowle~ge 
of the ownership interest of Plaintiff Cousins and Plaintiff Johnson in Defendant DTC 
Group. 
50. As a result of Defendant Crossett and Defendant DTC Group's unauthorized acts 
of transfer and sale to Defendants Lee and Vurv, and then subsequently retransferred or 
sold to Defendants Schmelling, Plaintiffs have been forced to incur costs and attorney 
fees to protect their interest. 
COUNT IV - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES - LOYALTY 
51. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
52. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Crossett has 
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breached his duty of loyalty to Plaintiffs by failing to account to Plaintiffs regarding the 
property, profit, and benefit derived by its members, including: 
A. Failure to properly distribute income and distributions; 
B. Appropriating and/or subverting company opportunities to other businesses 
owned by Defendant Crossett; 
C. Dealing with the Company and its other members in conduct as or on behalf of 
a person not a member of the company; 
D. Competing with the Company by diverting business to Vurv, LLC or 
TruGuard, LLC, or both; and 
E. Attempting to remove Plaintiffs as a member of DTC Group, modifying 
records or otherwise attempting to misrepresent Plaintiffs' ownership in the company 
F. Attempting to sell the company or all of the assets of the company without the 
authorization of Plaintiffs and without proper authority or compensation to Plaintiffs. 
53. Plaintiffs have, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT V - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES - CARE 
54. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
55. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Crossett has 
breached his duty of care by engaging in wrongful and/or willful and intentional 
misconduct to attempt to force Plaintiffs out of DTC Group. 
56. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs also asserts that Defendant Crossett 
knowingly violated law by failing to provide proper tax documentation and statements to 
Plaintiffs. 
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57. Plaintiffs further assert that Defendant Crossett has knowingly failed in his 
obligations as Manager of DTC Group to obtain the proper authorization for disposition 
of company assets, to properly hold meetings, to provide notice of meetings, to keep 
records, or other governance requirements, and that such actions constitutes grossly 
negligent conduct, and/or willful or intentional misconduct in Defendant Crossett' s 
management of DTC Group. 
58. Plaintiffs have, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VI - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES - GOOD FAITH/FAIR 
DEALING 
59. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
60. Defendant Crossett, through his actions, breached his duties and obligations owed 
to Plaintiff and other Members of DTC Group by failing to execute his obligations 
created either by statute of Idaho Law or by the oral operating agreement, consistent with 
the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 
61. Plaintiffs have, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VII - IMPROPER DISTRIBUTIONS 
62. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
63. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Crossett has 
provided distributions to himself and others in violation of Idaho Code 30-25-406, and in 
violation of the oral operating agreement. 
64. Plaintiffs have, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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COUNT VIII - IMPROPER TERMINATION/EXPULSION OF MEMBER 
65. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
66. Defendant Crossett's actions in attempting to remove both Plaintiffs from DTC 
Group based upon his "majority interest" constitutes an improper termination and/or 
expulsion of members. 
67. Plaintiffs have, as a result, been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT IX - REMOVAL OF DEFENDANT AS MEMBER 
68. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
69. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Crossett has 
and is engaging in wrongful conduct that has affected adversely and materially the 
company's activities and affairs. 
70. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Crossett has 
willfully and persistently committed material breach of the oral operating agreement or a 
duty or obligation under section 30-25-409 of the Idaho Code. 
71. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Crossett has 
engaged and is engaging in conduct relating to the company's activities and affairs which 
makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the activities and affairs with Defendant 
Crossett as a member. 
72. Plaintiffs, therefore, are entitled to relief under Section 30-25-601(6) to have a 
judicial order expelling Defendant Crossett as a member of DTC Group. 
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COUNT X - UNLAWFUL TRANSFER 
73. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
74. Plaintiffs assert that the sale and transfer of their interest in DTC Group to 
Defendant Lee and the subsequent sale of the business or all or substantially all of the 
assets of Defendant DTC Group constitute voidable transactions or transfers under Idaho 
Code §55-910, et seq. 
75. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Lee and Defendants Schmelling were on notice of 
other persons who did not support or otherwise provide authority for such transfers to 
occur. 
76. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Crossett acting for himself and on behalf of 
Defendant DTC Group underwent the transfer with the actual intent to defraud Plaintiffs 
by: i) transferring membership interest to himself and/or Defendant Lee, ii) retaining 
possession or control of the business assets after the transfer to Defendant Lee or 
Defendants Schmelling; iii) concealing the transfer of interest to himself and/or 
Defendant Lee and subsequently Defendants Schmelling; iv) the transfer was for 
substantially all of Defendant DTC Groups assets; and for other such reasons as may be 
determined at trial 
77. As a result of Defendants' combined actions Plaintiffs have been harmed in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT XI - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS 
EXPECTANCY 
78. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
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79. Plaintiffs, as members of DTC Group, had a valid business expectancy and 
financial interest in DTC Group. 
80. Defendants Crossett, Lee, and Schmellings understood and appreciated that other 
parties other than themselves had such business expectancy and financial interest. 
81. Defendants Vurv and DTC Group, by virtue of the understanding imputed to them 
through principals of the businesses, likewise appreciated and understood that Plaintiffs 
had such business expectancy and financial interest. 
82. Notwithstanding this understanding, Defendants Crossett, Lee, Vurv, DTC Group, 
and Schmellings took improper and unauthorized action to interfere with Plaintiffs' 
business expectancy and interest. 
83. As a result of Defendants Crossett's, Lee's, Vurv's, DTC Group's, and 
Schmellings' improper interference with Plaintiffs' business expectancy and interest, 
Plaintiffs have been damaged in amounts to be proven at trial, and have had to incur legal 
costs and fees to enforce their rights. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows: 
1. That the Court adjudge and declare that DTC Group was and is a three-member LLC 
existing under the laws of Idaho, with the Members identified as Defendant Crossett, 
Plaintiff Johnson, and Plaintiff Cousins; 
2. That the Court adjudge and decree that Plaintiff Johnson is a Member of DTC Group, 
with an interest of forty-four percent (44%) or in the alternative, an interest of thirty-
three percent (33%); 
3. That the Court adjudge and decree that Plaintiff Cousins is a Member of DTC Group, 
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with an interest of ten percent (10%) or in the alternative, an interest of thirty-three 
percent (33%); 
4. That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendant Crossett has breached his fiduciary 
duty of loyalty; 
5. That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendant Crossett has breached his fiduciary 
duty of care; 
6. That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendant Crossett has breached his fiduciary 
duty of good faith and fair dealing; 
7. That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendants have engaged in the conduct 
complained herein and/or proven at trial, and are liable to Plaintiffs for that conduct; 
8. That the Court adjudge and decree that the transfer of any interest in DTC Group to 
Defendant Lee by Defendant Crossett is void, and re-vest such transferred interests, if 
any, in Plaintiffs; 
9. That the Court adjudge and decree that the transfer of any assets and interest in DTC 
Group by Defendants Crossett and DTC Group, and any assumption of assets and 
interest in the assets of DTC Group by Defendants Schmelling, or any business entity 
owned or controlled by the Defendants Schmelling, be void, and to retransfer, re-
convey, or otherwise reinstate the transferred assets and business interests, if any, to 
DTC Group; 
10. That Plaintiff be awarded actual damages, compensatory damages, special damages, 
punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and any and all other remedies as determined by 
the Court in an amount to be proven at trial; 
11. That Defendants be enjoined from further wrongful and acts as set forth herein and as 
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shall be proven at trial, including but not limited to preventing Plaintiffs from having 
access to business records; 
12. That Defendant Crossett be expelled from DTC Group, LLC, forthwith, and control 
returned to the remaining members, pursuant to 30-25-602(6); 
13. That Plaintiffs recover from Defendants their costs, including reasonable attorney 
fees, pursuant to I.R.C.P. and any other applicable rules, statutes, or provisions of 
Idaho law, and a reasonable attorney fee in the amount of $8,000 in the event of 
default; and, 
14. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DA TED this 7th day of April, 2016. 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of April, 2016, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document(s) was served upon: 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
Matthew K. Taylor 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
802 W Bannock St 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6608 
Tom C. Morris 
Daniel W. Bower 
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS, PLLC 
12550 W Explorer Dr, Ste 100 
Boise, ID 83713 
Facsimile: (208) 345-4461 
DA TED this 11th day of April, 2016. 
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Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
By_._~------+-------''"--F=~~=-----~---
James F acobson, ofth 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Ma.in, Ste. 222 
Boise) ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
NO ____ ~FIL~ED::---i~~.--1,~~~. 
A.M. ____ _tP.M._i~-~--
JUL 18 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clork 
Dy ~ANTIAGO tlt.P.F:IOG 
CCPurr 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nJDICIAL DlSTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individl.lal, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLAINCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company,VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BOW. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married couple 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1513887 
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Defendant David Crossett, Dmg Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC, by 
and through their counsel of record Michelle R. Points of Points Law, PLLC, and by way of 
answer to the First Amended Complaint (''Complai:n.t")filed by Plaintiffs David Johnson and 
Tessa Cousins, admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
1. Defendants deny the allegations set forth. in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Complaint 
as those allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
ORIGINAL 
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2. Defendants admjt the allegations set forth in paragraphs 3; 4 and 5 of the 
Complaint. 
3. Defendants deny the al1egations set forth in paragraph 6 of the Complaint based 
upon a lack of knowledge. 
4. Defendants admit the a.Jlegation set forth in paragraphs 7 and 8 of th~ Complaint. 
5. Defendants deny the allegations set forth in paragraphs 9 of the Complaint based 
upon a lack of knowledge. 
6. Paragraph JO of the Complaint alleges no facts. 
7. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1 t of the Complaint. 
8. Defendants deny the allegations contained jn paragraphs l 2 and J 3 of the 
Complaint. 
9. Defendant.c; admit the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Complaint. 
10. Defendants deny the all~gations contained in paragraph 15 of the Complaint as 
those allegations are not directed at Defendants. 
11 . Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 16, 17 and J 8 of the 
Complaint, as stated. 
12. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the Complaint. 
13. Defendants deny the allegations contained .in paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 
and 27 of the Complaint. 
14. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the 
Complaint as those allegations are not directed at Defendants. 
15. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 30, and 31 of the 
Complaint as stated. 
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 2 
000043
07118/2016 11:13 208336~8 LAW OFFICES PAGE 04/11 
16. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 32 of the Complajnt as 
stated. 
17. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 of the 
Complaint. 
18. ln response to paragraph 36 of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
19. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 37 of the Complaint as 
those allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
20. Defendants deny the allegations set forth in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the 
Complaint. 
21. In response to paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previous]y set forth. 
22. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 41 of the Complaint as 
those allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
23. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the 
Complaint. 
24. In response to paragraph 44 of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
25. Defen.dants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 45 of the Complaint as 
those allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
26. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 46, 4 7, 48, 49 and 50 of 
the Complaint on the basis that they are not true and/or on the basis that they are 
not directed at these Defendants. 
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27. ln response to paragraph 5 l of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
28. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 52 and 53 of the 
Complaint. 
29. In response to paragraph 54 of the Complaint~ Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
30. Defendants deny the allegations contained in pa.ragraphs 55, 56, 57 and 58 of the 
Complaint. 
31 . In response to paragraph 59 of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
32. Defendants deny the allegations set forth in paragraphs 60 and 61 of the 
Complaint. 
33. In response to paragraph 62 of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
34. Defendants deny the allegations set forth m paragraphs 63 and 64 of the 
Complaint. 
35. In response to paragraph 65 of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
36. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 66 and 67 of the 
Complaint. 
37. In response to paragraph 68 of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
38. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 69, 70, 71, 72. 
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39. lo response to paragraph 73 of the Complaint, Defe.ndants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
40. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 74, 75, 76 and 77 of the 
Complaint. 
41. In response to paragraph 78 of the Complaint, Defendants restate all admissions 
and denials previously set forth. 
42, Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 79, 80, 81, 82, and 83 of 
the Complafot on the basis that they are not true and/or that they are not directed 
at these Defendants. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief Ol' allegation 
of Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and 
all of Plaintiffs' claims for relief. In addition, Defendants1 in asserting the following defenses, 
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is 
upon Defendants but, to the contrary, assert that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant 
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses 
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is 
upon Plaintiffs. Moreover, Defendants do not admit. in asserting any defense, any responsibility 
or liability of Defendants, but, to the contrary, specifically deny any and all allegations of 
responsibility and liability in the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendants based upon the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
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SECOND AFFJRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff are barred from maintaining this action based on the equitable theories of 
Jaches, waiver and estoppeL 
THIRD AFFIRM ATJVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs lacks standing to assert the claims set for.th i.n the Complaint. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs arc barred from maintaining this action against Defendants by reason of 
Plaintiffs' telea~e of claim::., if auy, upon which this action is based as against Defendants. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendants because Plaintiffs, 
by failing to act reasonably, have failed to mitigate the damages to which Plaintiffs may have 
been entitled, if any. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff should be denied any equitable relief herein on the ground of unclean bands. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint are frivolous and the Complaint fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
RULE 11 STATEMENT 
Defendants have considered and believe that they may have additional defenses, but does 
not have enough infonnation at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule 11 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants do not intend to waive any such defenses and 
specifically assert their intention to amend this Answer if, pending research after discovery, or 
following evidence presented at trial, facts come to light giving rise to such additional defenses. 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants have been required to retain the law firm of Points Law, PLLC, to defend 
th.em in this litigation. Defendants should be awarded their attorney fees and cost5 incuned in 
said defense pursuant to J.C.§ 12-120 (3) and other applicable law. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for entry of judgment, as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiffs take nothing thereby; 
2. That Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily 
incurred in defending this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2016 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J 8th day of July, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT by the method indicated 
below a.nd addressed to ea.ch of the following: 
Ja.mesr. Jacobson 
.Tames S. Neal Mccubbins 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
:Roise, Idaho 83714 
__ U.S Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
/ Overnight Mail 
_\/'_ Fax (208)477-5210 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
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CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH Cl rk 
By JAMIE MARTIN ' 8 
DEPUTY 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individua.1, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individuali DRUG TESTING 
COMPLATNCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BO W. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married couple, 
Defendants. 
A. Summary of Defense 
Case No. CV OC 1513887 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA 
Plaintiffs assert an ownership interest in Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC (OTC), 
the a..~ets of which were later sold to Vurv, LLC. Both entities are now dissolved and their 
financial matters wound up. 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA 
CV- 0C-2015-13887 
PTME 
Pretrial Memorandum 
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Mr. Crossett di.d have discussions with both Mr. Johnson and Ms. Cousins about having 
an ownership interest in OTC, however, neither of the Plaintiffs were willing to assume any of 
the risks or debts associated with the ongoing operation. ofDTC. Ms. Cousins tenninated her 
relationship with OTC and Mr. Johnson simply walked away. Mr. Crossett continued to own 
and operate OTC and assumed all the risk and debt associated with those operations. 
Plaintiffs did not ever consummate any ownership interest in DTC~ and quite the 
opposite, left Mr. Crossett ''holding the bag" when the operation of OTC became difficult, 
including being sued within the first week of operation. 
Through this litigation, it appears that Plaintiffs are now asserting an ownership interest 
in DTC and seek a portion of any profits that they would have been entitled to as an owner. 
However, as set forth above, DTC is now dissolved and wound up) and Mr. Crossett covered its 
debts, to his extreme financial detriment. 
8. Statement of Uncontested and Contested Facts and Issues of Law 
These Defendants do not contest that Plaintiffs' ownership was discussed and even acted 
upon by way of purchasing company phones, drafting an operating agreement and similar 
actions. Tt is not disputed that Mr. Johnson contributed mon.ey to the start-up ofDTC, which 
monies were paid back. It is not disputed that both Mr. Johnson and Ms. Cousins refused to take 
on any debt or risk associated with the operati.on of OTC. 
Tb.ese Defendants dispute that Plaintiffs ever had an actual ownership interest in. DTC. 
Plaintiffs appear to take the position that there was some type of oral contract pertaining to 
ownership that was reduced to writing in an operating agreement drafted by Plaintiffs' current 
counsel. However, Mr. Johnson and Ms. Cousins never signed any operating agreement, and 
M.r. Johnson specifically refu.fled on several occasions to sign the drafted operating agreement. 
PRE-TRTAL MEMORANDA 2 
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It is the position of these Defendants that if there was some ''handshake" agreement that 
the Plaintiffs would gain an ownership interest in DTC, that agreement was breached by the 
actions of Plajntiffs. 
C. Evidentiary Issues 
These Defendants currently have a pending motion in limi:oe and motion to bifurcate, that 
are set for hearing on September 30, 2016, which address the summary of evidentiary issues. 
It is unclear at this juncture how Plaintiffs intend to establish damages. However, as set 
forth in the motion to birfurcate, it is the position Defendants that they must first establish 
ownership and if and when they establish ownership, they can then move on to establish 
damages. To proceed otherwise would be unduly prejudicial; i.e. showing that Defendants made 
a profit that they d1d not allocate to Plaintiffs prior to establi~hir1~ Lhjj.L PlWl.lliffs arc enti.tlcd to 
such an allocation. 
The other area of concern for Defendants is presentation. any eviden.ce pertaining to Mr. 
Crossett's relationship with Scott Lee. Mr. Lee asserted that he was an owner of Vurv, LLC, not 
dissimilar to the claims bein.g asserted by Plcdntiffs. Any evidence of Mr. Crosse:":tt'~ interactions 
or agreements with Mr. Lee are irrelevant to the issue at trial an.d should not be allowed into 
evidence via documents or testimony. 
Because it is not clear how Plaintiffs will establish damages~ evidentiazy objections will 
have to be made as evidence is presented. 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA 3 
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DA TED this 23rd day of September, 2016 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of September, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA by the method indicated below and 
addressed to each of the following: 
James F. Jacobson 
James S. Neal McCubbins 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, Idaho 83 714 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDA 
__ U.S Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Fax (~08) 477-5210 
~· 
4 
James F. Jacobson   [ISB No. 7011]  
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID 83714 
Telephone:  (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile:   (208) 477-5210  
Email:  james@jjlawidaho.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
                  
 COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiffs, DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, 
and TESSA COUSINS, an individual in the above matter, by and through their counsel of 
record, Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC, and hereby submits this Pre-Trial Memorandum: 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
                                       Plaintiffs, 
vs.  
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BO W. 
and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married 
couple, 
                         Defendants. 
 CASE NO. CV OC 1513887 
PLAINTIFFS’ PRE-TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM
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Electronically Filed
9/23/2016 3:58:57 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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I. 
STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS’ CASE 
 Plaintiffs expect the evidence at trial to show the following: (1) that Plaintiffs 
were and are Members of DTC Group, LLC (hereafter “DTC”) with a combined 
ownership interest of fifty-five percent (55%); (2) that Defendant Crossett breached his 
fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith and fair dealing; (3) Defendant Crossett 
provided improper distributions to himself and others in violation of Idaho Code 
30-25-404; and (4) Defendant Crossett improperly expelled Plaintiffs as Members of 
DTC, and sold or otherwise transferred such interests to Defendant Lee. 
A. Plaintiffs were and are Members of DTC. 
Under Idaho law, an individual can be a member of a limited liability company (LLC) 
either (1) upon formation of the LLC, or (2) after formation of the LLC through various 
ways, including the “affirmative vote or consent of all the members.”  I.C. § 
30-25-401(b), (c)(3).  Section 30-25-102 defines a Member as one who has become a 
member as provided in Idaho Code § 30-25-401 and has not dissociated through one of 
the events of dissociation.  I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(7).  Section 30-25-102 also provides the 
definition for “Contribution” as “property or a benefit . . . that is provided by a person to 
a limited liability company to become a member or in that person’s capacity as a 
member.” I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(2).  Such a contribution can be in the form of “property 
transferred to, services performed for, or another benefit provided to the limited liability 
company.”  I.C. § 30-25-402. 
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The evidence at trial will show that both Plaintiffs Johnson and Cousins have been 
members of DTC since its early days in June of 2013.  Plaintiff Johnson has been a 
member since the formation of DTC.  He approached Defendant Crossett with the idea to 
create DTC in May of 2013.  Together, they formed DTC in early June of 2013 by filing a 
Certificate of Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State.  During the inception of 
DTC, Plaintiff Johnson made a contribution of $3,000, the purpose for which was clearly 
“to become a member or in [his] capacity as a member.”  I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(2). 
Defendant Crossett erroneously tried to label this contribution as a loan to DTC, rather 
than capital that Plaintiff Johnson provided to DTC as a member.  The evidence will 
clearly show that Plaintiff Johnson was one of the initial members of DTC. 
The evidence will also show that Plaintiff Cousins was either (1) an initial member of 
DTC, or (2) awarded membership by “consent of all the members.”  I.C. § 30-25-401. 
Defendant Crossett and Plaintiff Johnson approached Plaintiff Cousins in early June of 
2013 for the purpose of bringing her expertise into the business as neither Plaintiff 
Johnson nor Defendant Crossett had any substantial experience in the field of drug testing 
compliance for commercial driver’s license holders.  Therefore, Plaintiff Cousins 
contribution to DTC was to be her “services performed for” DTC.  I.C. § 30-25-402. 
This contribution, like that of Plaintiff Johnson, was clearly “to become a member or in 
[her] capacity as a member.”  Therefore, she was also an initial member of DTC upon its 
formation, and such membership continues today since she has not dissociated her 
membership. 
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Furthermore, even if Plaintiff Cousins was not an initial member, she was certainly 
made a member by “consent of all the members.”  I.C. § 30-25-401.  Defendant Crossett 
met with Plaintiff Cousins to offer her a place in the business because her expertise was 
necessary for DTC to get off the ground.  During these negotiations, she was offered a 
10% ownership interest in DTC for her contribution of services.  Both Plaintiff Johnson 
and Defendant Crossett agreed to award her membership in exchange for her services. 
Therefore, if Plaintiff Cousins was not an initial member of DTC, she was later awarded 
membership by consent of all the members of DTC (i.e., Plaintiff Johnson and Defendant 
Crossett).  In either scenario, Plaintiff Cousins was a member from the early stages of 
DTC and continues to be so as she has not dissociated her membership. 
B. Plaintiffs have a combined membership interest in DTC totaling fifty-five 
percent (55%). 
Under Idaho law, an operating agreement for a limited liability company can be “oral, 
implied, in a record, or in any combination thereof” so long as it is an agreement between 
all the member of the limited liability company.  I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(9); see also Estate 
of E.A. Collins v. Geist, 143 Idaho 821, 153 P.3d 1167 (2007) (validating the existence of 
an oral operating agreement between the members of an LLC).  Idaho law further 
explains: 
[A]s soon as a limited liability company has any members, the limited 
liability company perforce has an operating agreement.  For example, 
suppose: (i) two persons orally and informally agree to join their activities 
in some way through the mechanism of an LLC; (ii) they form the LLC or 
cause it to be formed; and (iii) without further ado or agreement, they 
become the LLC’s initial members.  An operating agreement exists. 
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I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(9), cmt. (emphasis added).  In sum, Idaho law reflects the fact 
that an LLC cannot exists without an operating agreement.  I.C. § 30-25-105, cmt. 
(“Accordingly, this act refers to ‘the operating agreement’ rather than ‘an operating 
agreement.’”).   
The operating agreement of an LLC is “the map to the parties’ deal.”  I.C. § 
30-25-105, cmt.  This map includes the “[r]elations among the members as members and 
between the members and the limited liability company,” including the division of 
ownership interests among the members, and their contribution for that ownership 
interest.  I.C. § 30-25-105(a)(1). 
 Whether Plaintiff Cousins was an initial member, or became a member promptly 
after formation of DTC, there was an oral agreement between Plaintiff Johnson, Plaintiff 
Cousins, and Defendant Crossett that the ownership interests of DTC would be, 
respectively, 45%, 10%, and 45%.  The contributions for Plaintiffs’ interest was agreed as 
described in the previous section.  Therefore, there was an oral agreement for DTC 
reflecting ownership interests for the Plaintiffs that combine to equal 55%.  Not only was 
this agreed to at the time that all three parties became members of DTC, but it was 
echoed throughout the following year as they ran the operations of DTC.  As such, the 
evidence shows that the Plaintiffs have a combined membership interest in DTC totaling 
55%. 
C. Defendant Crossett breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty as a member of DTC. 
In Idaho, a limited liability company is a member-managed limited liability company 
by default, unless the operating agreement explicitly states otherwise.  I.C. § 
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30-25-407(a).  In a member-managed LLC, all members owe both the company and their 
fellow members a fiduciary duty of loyalty.  This duty of loyalty includes the duties: (1) 
“to account to the company and to hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit 
derived by the member” in the winding up activities, from use of company property, or 
from appropriation of a company opportunity; (2) to refrain from dealing with the 
company on behalf of those having an interest adverse to the company in either the 
conduct of the business activities, or during the winding up of the company; and (3) to 
refrain from competing with the company.  I.C. § 30-25-409(b)(1)-(3).   
The evidence at trial will show that Defendant Crossett breached this duty by failing 
to account to Plaintiffs regarding the property, profit, and benefit derived as a member. 
He failed to properly distribute income and distributions to all members.  He appropriated 
and subverted company opportunities to other businesses owned by himself, particularly 
in his dealings with Defendant Vurv, LLC.  He dealt with DTC on behalf of persons who 
were not a member of DTC.  He attempted to remove Plaintiffs as members of DTC, and 
modified records in an attempt to misrepresent Plaintiffs’ ownership in DTC.  And he 
attempted to sell the DTC without the authorization of Plaintiffs and without proper 
compensation to Plaintiffs.  Each of these acts represents a breach in Defendant Crossett’s 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to both DTC and Plaintiffs as members of DTC. 
D. Defendant Crossett breached his fiduciary duty of care to DTC. 
In a member-managed LLC, all members owe a fiduciary duty of care to both the 
company and to their fellow members. See I.C. § 30-25-409(c), cmt. (stating that, 
although the statute does not refer to the duty of care as a fiduciary duty, it is still 
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substantively a fiduciary duty).  This duty requires that a member “refrain from engaging 
in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, willful or intentional misconduct, or knowing 
violation of the law.”  I.C. § 30-25-409(c).   
The evidence at trial will show that Defendant Crossett engaged in wrongful, willful, 
and intentional misconduct.  An example of such misconduct includes Defendant 
Crossett’s attempt to force Plaintiffs out of DTC.  Defendant Crossett also knowingly 
violated the law by failing to provide proper tax documentation and statements to 
Plaintiffs as members of DTC.  Defendant Crossett also knowingly failed in his 
obligations as member-manager of DTC to obtain the proper authorization for disposition 
of company assets, to properly hold meetings with the other members, to provide notice 
of such meetings, to keep accurate records, or other governance requirements.  Such 
actions constitute grossly negligent conduct, and/or willful or intentional misconduct on 
the part of Defendant Crossett.  As such, Defendant Crossett has breached his fiduciary 
duty of care to both DTC and Plaintiffs as members of DTC. 
E. Defendant Crossett breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Members in a member-managed LLC also have a duty to “discharge the duties and 
obligations under this chapter or under the operating agreement and exercise any rights 
consistently with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing.”  I.C. § 
30-25-409(d).  Unlike the duties of care and loyalty, the contractual obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing is not a fiduciary duty.  I.C. § 30-25-409(d), cmt.  “It is rather a 
commitment to deal ‘fairly’ in the sense of consistently with the terms of the parties’ 
agreement and its purpose.”  Gerber v. Enter. Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 
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418-19 (Del. 2013) (quoting ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge 
Managing Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 440-42 (Del. Ch. 2012).  Courts should use the 
obligation to “protect agreed-upon arrangements from conduct that is manifestly beyond 
what a reasonable person could have contemplated when the arrangements were made.” 
I.C. § 30-25-409(d), cmt.   
Evidence will show that Defendant Crossett’s actions with regards to Plaintiffs as 
members of DTC indicate a failure to discharge his duties consistently with his obligation 
of good faith and fair dealing.  In particular, his perspective that Plaintiffs were never 
members and that he had the right and authority to sell their ownership interest to another 
party are “manifestly beyond what a reasonable person could have contemplated” when 
the oral operating agreement was made.  I.C. § 30-25-409(d), cmt.  Therefore, Defendant 
Crossett’s actions demonstrate that he breached his contractual obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing towards Plaintiffs. 
F. Defendant Crossett did not properly share distributions with Plaintiffs. 
Idaho Code Section 30-25-404 states that “[a]ny distributions made by a limited 
liability company before its dissolution and winding up must be in equal shares among 
members.”  I.C. § 30-25-404(a).  The Code further states “[i]f a member . . . becomes 
entitled to receive a distribution, the member . . . is entitled to all remedies available to a 
creditor of the limited liability company with respect to the distribution.”  I.C. 
§30-25-404(d). 
The evidence at trial will not only show that Defendant Crossett made distributions to 
himself from DTC’s formation in 2013 through to the present, but that these distributions 
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were never shared with Plaintiffs.  The Idaho Code, along with the operating agreement 
of DTC, give Plaintiffs Johnson and Cousins a right to 45% and 10% of these 
distributions, respectively.  The facts show that either: (1) Defendant Crossett took nearly 
all of the distributions, so he owes Plaintiffs their share of what he took, plus interest 
added over time; or (2) Defendant Crossett only took his share of the distributions, and 
DTC owes Plaintiffs both their share of each of these distributions and added interest as 
they are considered creditors of DTC. 
G. Defendant Crossett improperly expelled Plaintiffs as members of DTC. 
The Idaho Code only provides three ways in which a member can be expelled as a 
member from an LLC.  See I.C. §30-25-602(4)-(5).  First, a member may be expelled as a 
member of an LLC pursuant to any such clause of the operating agreement.  I.C. § 
30-25-6032(4).  Second, a member can be expelled if it is “unlawful to carry on the 
limited liability company’s activities and affairs with the person as a member.”  I.C. § 
30-25-602(5)(A).  And third, a member can be expelled if all of that person’s transferable 
interest in the LLC has been transferred, other than a transfer for security purposes or a 
charging order in effect that has not been foreclosed.  I.C. § 30-25-602(5)(B).  In other 
words, that member no longer has any “skin in the game.”  I.C. § 30-25-602(5)(B), cmt. 
In the present case, none of these three events occurred with regards to Plaintiffs.  The 
oral operating agreement does not specify events that warrant expulsion of a member as 
no such term was ever agreed to by the parties.  It was not unlawful for DTC to continue 
its affairs with Plaintiffs as members.  And neither Plaintiff transferred any of their 
interest to another party, let alone all of their transferrable interest.  Therefore, Defendant 
PLAINTIFFS’ PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM – Page !9
000061
Crossett had no right to attempt to expel Plaintiffs as members of DTC, and such actions 
have resulted in damages suffered by Plaintiffs. 
II. 
CONTESTED AND UNCONTESTED FACTS 
At this time, all facts of this case are contested.  Plaintiffs are unaware of any 
uncontested facts. 
III. 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
Certain evidentiary issues have been addressed in Defendant Crossett’s Motion in 
Limine.  All the evidentiary issues related to that Motion are either in the Motion itself or 
in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Crossett’s Motion in Limine. 
Plaintiffs have one additional issue that was not addressed in the Motion in Limine. 
That is, Defendant Crossett should not be allowed to testify to financial documents that 
have not been produced to Plaintiffs. 
 DATED this 23rd day of September, 2016.  
      JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
      By /s/ James F. Jacobson 
            James F. Jacobson 
            Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of September, 2016, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document(s) was served upon: 
 DATED this 23rd day of September, 2016. 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
By /s/ James F. Jacobson 
      James F. Jacobson, of the firm
 Attorneys for Plaintiffs                          
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
[   ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[   ] Hand-Delivered 
[X] iCourt/email 
[   ] Facsimile  
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
 
 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and  
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
 
      Case No. CV OC 15 13887 
Plaintiffs,  
      FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF     
vs. LAW AND DIRECTIONS FOR  ENTRY 
      OF JUDGMENT 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual,  
SCOTT H. LEE, an individual,  
DRUG TESTING COMPLIANCE  
GROUP, LLC, an Idaho limited liability  
company, VURV, LLC, an Idaho limited  
liability company, BO W. and KRYSTAL  
SCHMELLING, a married couple,  
  
Defendants.  
  
 
 
 This matter came before the Court for trial without a jury on Monday and Tuesday, 
October 16 and 17, 2016. James F. Jacobsen, of Jacobsen & Jacobsen, PLLC, Boise, appeared for 
the plaintiffs, David Johnson and Tessa Cousins. Michelle R. Points, Points Law, PLLC, Boise, 
appeared for the defendants David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC, and Vurv, 
LLC. 
 From the record, it appears that of the above named defendants in this matter, Scott H. Lee, 
was never served and the defendants Bo W. and Krystal Schmelling were dismissed by stipulation. 
The Court will note by minute entry that the defendant Scott H. Lee is dismissed. 
Signed: 11/1/2016 11:56 AM
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 Whereupon, the Court proceeded to receive the testimony and exhibits from the parties 
appearing in this matters. At the conclusion thereof counsel presented their final arguments to the 
Court and advised that all matters were thereupon submitted for decision. 
 Now therefore, being duly advised in the premises, the Court now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of Judgment. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
 There is little dispute over the following chronology: 
 1.  David Johnson learned of a business opportunity from his brother-in-law. The inference 
from the evidence is that the brother-in-law may not have been aware that he was providing 
Johnson with this insight into his business, but nevertheless, Johnson came away with enough 
knowledge to get his interest aroused. The business was aimed at a niche market created by federal 
regulations requiring independent owner-operators of over-the-road trucks to establish and 
maintain drug and alcohol compliance plans for their trucking operation, which included the 
requirement for the operators and all employees to obtain drug and alcohol test at random times 
when required to do so by federal regulation. The business opportunity called for a service 
company to handle all the details of establishing and maintaining a qualified compliance plan for 
small operators, arranging for drug and alcohol testing at facilities throughout the country, and 
maintaining all required records. 
 2.  Johnson got David Crossett interested, and the two then investigated the specifics of 
getting the company up and operating during the early months of 2013. Crossett was a friend of 
Johnson from their neighborhood and from their church, and was introduced to the opportunity by 
Johnson sometime after he learned of it from his brother-in-law. The two men worked both 
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together and independently to investigate the feasibility of the business during the February 
through March time frame.  
 3.  By April, they had decided on their general plan. There is no dispute that the venture 
was to have at least two members at the outset – David Crossett with 46% and David Johnson with 
44% membership interests. The plan was for Crossett to run the company. He was to be the sole 
agent and manager, and was to receive a fixed salary for his services. Crossett testified that this 
was to be $65,000 per annum, although in his deposition he estimated the amount to be $60,000. 
There was no dispute that he was to receive a fixed amount for being the one involved in the day 
to day operations, which would be before any division of profits between the members.  
 4.  Johnson owned and operated a separate company involved in the installation and 
servicing of overhead doors, which was his full time occupation, so he was not to be involved in 
the daily operations of the new company, and was not to receive any fixed compensation. Johnson 
knew of Tessa Cousins, who was an employee of the brother-in-law’s company, and after 
discussion with Crossett, they decided that Crossett would approach Cousins with a proposal for 
her to join their new company. They felt that her familiarity with the business operation of the 
brother-in-law’s business would be valuable. 
 5.  Crossett approached Cousins in April with a proposal for employment, and she 
expressed interest. After discussing it with her husband, she replied in May that she would accept. 
She was to receive a regular salary for her position, and was to receive an interest in the company. 
It is not clear whether she was to receive the 10% interest immediately upon her employment, or 
was to earn her way into it, but it is not disputed that Johnson and Crossett had agreed upon 
Cousins becoming a 10% member of the company at some point in time. 
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 6.  The limited liability company Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC, hereafter DTC, 
was formed by David Crossett in June of 2013 as a single member entity, with David Crossett 
being the sole member upon filing, and with the documentation not stating anything about other 
members, and not identifying Johnson or Cousins. 
 7.  A complete, written operating agreement was prepared and approved by both men by 
the end of July 2013. The basic agreement was taken from a written operating agreement Crossett 
had for another company, which was revised by the two men and approved by Johnson’s attorneys 
to meet the requirements of the new company. A final version of the agreement was prepared and 
was available to the parties for signature by the end of July 2013. However, the written agreement 
was never signed.  
 8.  The company had opened for business earlier in July without waiting for the execution 
of the operating agreement.  By opening for business, the company opened a web site and call 
center and began accepting business subscriptions for the compliance plan from trucker-operators. 
Once the operation declared itself open for business, things very quickly turned away from 
whatever the two men had planned upon.  
 9.  Within a few days of the company’s announcing itself open for business, the company 
owned by Johnson’s brother-in-law filed a lawsuit against DTC Group and Tessa Cousins. This 
litigation was eventually settled in the summer of 2014, at a huge cost in legal fees. 
 10.  Johnson announced that he did not want to sign the operating agreement in 2013 
because he did not want his in-laws to know that he was connected to the new company. He 
signed a statement for his brother in-laws’ attorneys that, although he had supplied information 
about the in-laws’ business to Crossett, he did not have any interest in the entity that Crossett had 
formed. (Exhibit B) Although this statement was not under oath, Johnson knew that his      
000067
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT – PAGE 5 
 
brother-in-law and the attorneys were relying upon the statement in litigation. He told his wife that 
he planned to keep his ownership interest a secret. He told Crossett that he did not want to sign the 
operating agreement “until the dust settled.” 
 11.  Johnson indicated that there was an oral agreement that he did not need to sign the 
operating agreement. Crossett disagreed that there was such agreement, and continued to press 
Johnson to sign the operating agreement. 
 12.  Cousins was not a party to any of the discussions between Johnson and Crossett 
concerning the formation of the company. She did not even know of Johnson’s involvement when 
she joined the company in June of 2013, and did not meet him until later. She was not party to any 
oral operating agreement. She supervised office administration and sales. She had worked with 
DOT Group for about four months. She remained with DTC from June of 2013 until October of 
2014, when she tendered her resignation. She was paid a salary, and testified that she had been 
paid in full for all the time she was with the company. She indicated in the letter of resignation to 
the company that disagreements over ownership interests were the reason for her decision to 
resign. She testified that she expected to receive a 10% interest, but was told by Crossett that he 
intended to give that interest to Scott H. Lee. Crossett said she was asked to sign the operating 
agreement, but declined because of all the legal entanglements that were going on. It is not 
disputed that she did not sign the operating agreement. 
 13.  Crossett got the company started off quickly. By the end of 2013, it had grossed close 
to $200,000. In 2014, it grossed close to $1,100,000. Crossett’s testimony indicated that with this 
rapid growth came a flood of management problems. The company had no capital reserves, and 
the relatively tiny amount of capital that was supplied by Johnson was returned to him. Cash 
management was a constant problem. Crossett testified that financial problems plagued the 
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company almost from the outset, with huge legal fees accruing, and with problems making payroll 
and problems keeping their merchant accounts with the banks intact. The merchant accounts were 
the accounts with the bank for handling credit card payments from sales – an essential ingredient 
to the call center sales effort. The problems were with sales returns, and the common bank rule 
that if the returns reached a certain level, the merchant bank would close the account. Crossett 
explained that without any cash reserves, because of legal difficulties the company found itself in, 
because of the litigation from and against competitors, and because of bad publicity the company 
was receiving, the level of returns became very high and was constantly causing banks to close 
their accounts meaning they were constantly looking around for new banks to open merchant 
accounts.  
 14.  Although details were not explored in this trial, it was explained generally that the 
company had attracted many legal problems, including investigations by the Idaho Attorney 
General over customer complaints, the Federal Trade Commission for suspected price fixing, the 
Department of Justice and others. The legal entanglements were affecting sales, and the company 
was incurring huge legal expenses. Although one lawsuit between DTC and the DOT Group was 
settled in early 2014, another lawsuit was started later 2014. Johnson testified that he disagreed 
with this lawsuit and wanted nothing to do with it. 
 15.  Matters between Johnson and Crossett came to a head in the summer and early fall of 
2014. Crossett insisted that Johnson sign the operating agreement and join him in personally 
guaranteeing something in excess of $200,000 that was due from DTC to the Perkins Coie law 
firm. Johnson refused. Johnson indicated that he considered all of the legal problems and 
management issues to be Crossett’s problem to solve, and he was not willing to sign the operating 
agreement until the problems were resolved. 
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 16.  At one point, in October of 2014, Crossett texted to Johnson, “[N]othing worked out 
like you said it would and I’ve incurred massive risk and costs. You only want the possible upside 
of the business without the work or the risk. It doesn’t work like that . . . .” In next text segment, 
Crossett texts to Johnson, “We made an agreement under certain terms and conditions. You are 
deluded if you don’t agree those terms and conditions changed and this is nothing like we 
expected.” (Exhibit 6) 
 17.  Johnson and Crossett could not come to terms over this, and Crossett finally declared 
that he would continue with DTC as a single member company and do what he had to do to 
salvage what he could. Johnson asked that the company repay all the money he had provided at the 
outset for office equipment, computers and supplies. During the late fall and early winter of 2014, 
Crossett caused the company to repay all of the money that Johnson had provided, being 
approximately $10,000. Johnson acknowledged that this was all the money he had invested in the 
company, and that he had been fully repaid what he had provided to the company by December of 
2014. 
 18.  Crossett brought Scott Lee in to consult on the lagging sales problem. Lee was 
familiar with call center operations, and thought that he could dramatically increase sales. Lee 
wanted nothing to do with DTC because of the legal problems, the pending lawsuit with DOT 
Group and the mounting legal fees. Lee’s recommendation was that Crossett bankrupt DTC and 
start with a brand new company. Crossett entered into an arrangement with Lee to outsource sales 
to a separate call center company Lee would run. Lee said he never worked “for” anybody and 
wasn’t for hire. Lee’s efforts would have to come through the operations of a new company that 
Lee had an interest in, as it was the only way he would participate. He (Lee) wanted nothing to do 
with DTC. 
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 19.  Crossett and Lee formed Vurv, LLC, that was to be run by Lee and would handle 
sales. This was a call center operation that would handle a number of products and services 
suitable for call center solicitation and sales, which was Lee’s forte. The trucker drug compliance 
service offered by DTC was only one of the services to be sold by the Vurv call center operation. 
 20.  For a time in 2014 and into 2015, Crossett continued to operate DTC as a separate 
company, with the sales operation outsourced to Vurv.  However, with cash flow still a critical 
problem, and with the huge legal debt over his head, Crossett and Lee struck a deal whereby Vurv 
would acquire all of the assets of DTC in exchange for Vurv assuming and paying all of the debts 
of DTC, including specifically all legal fees due Perkins Coie. This transaction closed in 
December of 2015. As a result of this, beginning January 1, 2016, all operations of DTC were 
taken over by Vurv, and DTC essentially ceased to exist. 
 21.  The evidence is clear that Crossett did not close the asset sale to Vurv until after 
Cousins had resigned from the company, and after Crossett had exhausted his efforts to get 
Johnson to sign the operating agreement and help him with the obligation due Perkins Coie. He 
did not take this step until it became clear that Johnson would not sign the operating agreement 
and would not assist Crossett in the guarantee of the legal fees to the law firm. 
 22.  A full set of financial statements was not presented at trial. A schedule that contained 
cash basis income statements for DTC for the three years of its life, being 2013 through calendar 
2015, was offered. According to this statement, being the only evidence offered on this issue, the 
company produced cash net income of $67,600 on gross sales of $197,900 in 2013; $63,400 net 
income on gross sales of $1,099,400 in 2014; and a loss of -$25,900 on gross sales of $800,500 in 
2015; According to the exhibit, the total accumulated profit for the three years was $105,200 on 
total gross sales of $2,097,800. (Exhibit H).  
000071
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT – PAGE 9 
 
 23.  Crossett maintains that his compensation did not appear in the profit and loss 
statements as an expense to the company because his compensation from an accounting standpoint 
was a distributions of profit to an owner, and would have come after net profit was determined. He 
testified that his withdrawals against his guaranteed distribution absorbed all of the net income of 
the company. On cross-examination, it was brought out that in his deposition, he testified that his 
salary was posted to the salary expense column which would already be included in the profit and 
loss statement under salaries. The point was not clarified by bringing in the original postings, or 
by testimony from the outside accountants. From the evidence that was presented, the point is 
irrelevant, because under either approach, after taking into account the unposted liabilities for 
accounts payable and the debt due the lawyers, the company appears to have had unposted 
liabilities for general accounts in excess of $30,000 and the legal fees due Perkins Coie in excess 
of $200,000, with no unposted revenues. Apparently all the revenues were by customer debit or 
credit card through the merchant accounts, meaning essentially cash, and were fully recognized on 
the financial statements. This meant that the company had become insolvent by the end of 2015, 
which means it would have had no undistributed earnings available to distribute in any case, 
whether Crossett’s distributions to himself were before or after the accrued net income was 
determined. 
 24.  A spread sheet was provided that purported to present balance sheet accounts at 
month-end for October, November and December of 2015, determined on a cash basis. (Exhibit I) 
These balance sheets are meaningless without the connected profit and loss statements or 
statements of source and application of funds to show what and how the differences were 
accounted for, and without converting them to accrual statements to pick up the unposted accounts 
payable and long term debt. Although the last of the statements on Exhibit I is dated December 31, 
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2015, it does not tie to the profit and loss statement for the year then ending (Exhibit H). No 
meaningful conclusions can be drawn from these balance sheets other than identification of some 
of the balance sheet accounts. The sheets would show that, if the unposted liabilities were added to 
the statements, the company was insolvent by year end, 2015. 
 25.  Crossett testified that the trade accounts payable that Vurv took over totaled 
approximately $30,000, which are not reflected on any exhibit. Since expenses are not realized 
until paid, they do not show up in the profit and loss statements, and since the balance sheets are 
on a cash basis, they do not show up there, either. There was no dispute that the Perkins Coie bill 
was outstanding, although it is not reflected on any of the exhibits either. Crossett said the amount 
was approximately $200,000, while Lee testified that he understood the outstanding legal fees to 
be approximately $240,000.  
 26.  By the end of 2015, the total assets of the company consisted of office furniture and 
computers, which appears to have been depreciated out, and the balances in the merchant accounts 
reserves, which after offsets did not appear to exceed $50,000. The liabilities of the company are 
not correctly set forth in the cash basis statement, but would have been any payroll and payroll tax 
liabilities, negative reserves (if any) on merchant accounts, the general accounts payable and the 
legal debt. There was no bank debt or long term financing, and the leasehold interest was on an 
annual basis. Since the legal debt and general accounts payable were at least in the range of 
$240,000 and may have exceeded $280,000, this alone far exceeded the book value of the assets. It 
would appear from an accounting standpoint that the company would have been insolvent from an 
accounting standpoint at year end 2015.  
 27.  After January 1, 2016, the acquisition by Vurv left no assets in DTC to account for or 
distribute. It became an asset-free, debt-free shell of a company. 
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 28.  From all of this, I find as a fact that the only oral agreement between Johnson and 
Crossett which could have stood in for an operating agreement for the company was their 
agreement to operate the company until the written agreement was finished and could be signed.  
 29.  Insofar as there being an oral operating agreement, such was only to cover and ratify 
the actions actually taken by the individuals on behalf of the company until such time as the 
written agreement could be signed. As such, it was sufficient to ratify that Crossett was to be the 
manager of the venture with full authority to run the business as he saw fit, and that he was to 
receive a guaranteed distribution ahead of any distribution to members. It was not sufficient to 
cover the passive investment of Johnson. There was no meeting of the minds that Johnson could 
become a passive investor in the company without signing the operating agreement. Nor were the 
oral agreements between Crossett and Johnson sufficient to support the introduction of Cousins to 
membership in the company, as she had not been a party to any of the oral agreements between 
Crossett and Johnson. I find as a fact that the oral agreement with regard to Cousins and Johnson 
was that they would become members upon signing the operating agreement. 
 30.  It was not the mutual intent of the parties that the executory provisions of any oral 
agreement would substitute for the written operating agreement; it was not the mutual intent of the 
parties that either Johnson or Cousins could decline to sign the written operating agreement that 
Crossett and Johnson had agreed upon and approved, and still continue as members of the limited 
liability company. 
 31.  The written agreement was finished by the lawyers, and was ready to be signed by 
mid-July of 2013, but Johnson would not sign. Conditions had changed. The lawsuit by the DOT 
Group had been filed, and Johnson no longer wanted his name associated with DTC. He did not 
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want his in-laws to learn of his connection with DTC, he did not want to be deposed or to be 
included in the lawsuit. He wanted his involvement with DTC to be a secret. 
 32.  I find as a fact that Johnson unilaterally attempted to change the oral agreement, by 
then saying that he wanted to “wait until the dust settled” before he signed the operating 
agreement. This was not a mutual agreement, and clearly was not agreed to by Crossett. This left 
Crossett holding the bag as the sole member of the LLC, and left Crossett with all the risk of 
carrying the company’s operations forward. 
 33.  Once the first DOT lawsuit was resolved, at a huge legal expense to the company, 
Crossett again insisted that the operating agreement be signed, and also insisted that Johnson join 
Crossett in guaranteeing the legal bill to Perkins Coie. The expense had been incurred in defending 
the lawsuit that was brought by Johnson’s brother-in-law.  
 34.  In addition to the accrued legal fees, other legal problems with the state and federal 
authorities had cropped up and a second lawsuit against DOT Group was in the offing. Johnson 
again declined to sign. Johnson’s actions were contrary to what the two had agreed upon – that 
there would be a signed operating agreement.  
 35.  Furthermore, it became apparent to Crossett that some fundamental changes needed to 
be made if the company was to go forward. It was seriously undercapitalized, and the 
consequences of that were becoming apparent to Crossett. He was having to individually shore up 
the operations, without assistance from Johnson, and apparently could not get a handle on the cash 
flow requirements for the burgeoning sales. In the late summer of 2014, Crossett brought in Scott 
Lee, initially as a consultant, to see what could be done to increase revenues. Lee had experience 
in running call centers, which had turned out to be the crux of DTC’s sales effort and, apparently, 
the foci of its legal troubles with both state and federal authorities. 
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 36.  Lee testified that after he looked over the situation, he wanted nothing to do with 
DTC. He said that he would be interested in a program that he would set up to run the sales. There 
were discussions during this time about whether Lee would become a member of DTC. Johnson 
was aware that Crossett was meeting with Lee in an effort to improve sales. Johnson indicated to 
Crossett that he should do what he had to do to increase sales. 
 37.  Cousins learned of Crossett’s meetings with Lee. Cousins said that from what she was 
told, she understood that Crossett was going to give her interest in the DTC to Lee, although this 
was not true as Lee was not interested in acquiring any interest in DTC. Crossett said he was 
reluctant to grant an immediate 10% interest to Cousins, as he thought she ought to earn her way 
into the interest. In any event, Cousins declined to sign the operating agreement because she was 
leery of all the litigation and legal troubles. In her deposition in the lawsuit filed against DTC, and 
when asked if she was a member, she testified that she had never signed any documentation. She 
further became disenchanted with the deal when Scott Lee appeared on the scene and appeared to 
be headed towards receiving some sort of interest in the operation. In October of 2104, Cousins 
resigned from the company. She testified that she had been paid all of the salary that was due and 
she had no claim against the company for any unpaid compensation. All of Cousins’ legal fees at 
Perkins Coie were paid by DTC. 
 38.  There is no dispute that Cousins was paid $58,205.92, which included $320 marked 
“bonus” paid in July of 2014. The rest of the disbursement was for regular salary, paid throughout 
the period. David Johnson was paid $11,201.87. This consisted of a check for $1,411 paid in July 
of 2014 and the balance paid over from October through years’ end in 2014, which consisted of a 
return of all the money Johnson had contributed to the start-up of the company. Johnson testified 
that he has received back all of the money he paid into the company. Crossett withdrew a total of 
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$169,151.11. This included money to specifically reimburse Crossett for expenses advanced, with 
the balance being charged against the profits of the company. Crossett testified that he was to 
receive a guaranteed disbursement of $65,000 per year. (In his deposition, he recalled the 
understanding to be “approximately $60,000 per year.”) There was no evidence to dispute this 
understanding. Crossett’s guaranteed draw would have been $155,000 at $60,000 and $167,800 at 
$65,000 for the 32 months from June of 2013 through year end 2015. It appears the expense 
reimbursement to Crossett was at least $15,300. Therefore, I find as a fact that the total 
withdrawals by Crossett would not have exceeded the reimbursements for expenses and the 
amount he was entitled to withdraw as his guaranteed disbursement.  
 39.  DTC has been fully wound up and has no assets and no liabilities. Neither Johnson nor 
Cousins were or are involved in Vurv in any way, and neither have any claim against Vurv for 
anything. 
Analysis and Conclusions of Law 
 A limited liability company requires an operating agreement to breathe life into the 
venture, which can be an oral agreement. Typically, reliance upon an oral operating agreement is 
usually used where there is only one member, and therefore anything done by the member can be 
said to be done under an unwritten oral agreement with himself, or is used to ratify start-up actions 
taken until a formal agreement can be executed. Oral agreements may also be found where the 
members are all active in the day to day operations, and fully conversant with operating decisions. 
Many partnerships, for example, operate upon consensus decisions of the partnership on a day to 
day basis, which can serve as the equivalent of an oral operating agreement. 
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 In the instant case, almost the only element of an agreement between the parties here that 
was not constantly shifting and moving as events unfolded, is the understanding that there would 
be a written operating agreement that everyone would sign.  
 The law on limited liability companies is seriously underdeveloped. The limited liability 
company is a hybrid of partnership and corporate law, with elements of each. When the entities are 
completely formed, there is machinery to handle unforeseen circumstances. It can be said of a 
limited liability company, as can be said of most arrangements between individuals, that there is 
no need for a written agreement when things are going well. The need for the written agreement 
comes when things do not go as planned, and when disagreement begin to arise. In written 
agreements, there are dispute resolution mechanisms and executory provisions to drop in place 
when things go wrong, etc.  
 What is not clear in the law is what is to happen when things go wrong and the formation 
or the company is imperfectly carried out.  
 In partnership law and corporate law, these areas are covered by statutory provisions. 
Situations that are not covered by the agreement of the partners (in partnership law) or by action of 
the shareholders or directors (in corporate law) are covered by statutory provisions. When the 
partners disagree, their partnership ends and the law requires that it be wound up with statutory 
guidance at each step. When shareholders disagree, the law spells out the rights of majority and 
minority shareholders, specifies the actions that must be taken and the rights that are to be 
protected.  
 However, in the case of an LLC, the only guidance in the statutes is that these areas are to 
be handled as agreed in the operating agreement. But what happens when the formation is 
incomplete? 
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 With respect to Cousins, I think the law is clear. She was never a party to any of the oral 
agreements, and she never signed the written agreement, although it was ready and available to be 
signed. Cousins never became a member of the company. She indicated that she has been fully 
compensated for all of her services, and therefore, she has no claim against any of the defendants 
in this litigation. 
 With respect to Johnson, plaintiff contends that an operating agreement essential to the 
existence of an LLC can be an oral agreement, with which I agree as far as it goes. But this only 
works when things go as intended by the agreement of the parties, where the members of the LLC 
agree upon the existence of the entity and are concerned only with the day to day operating 
decisions, or where the terms of the oral operating agreement necessary to the issue can be 
established by the evidence. Trouble comes, and the statutes do not help, when there is 
disagreement over the fundamental terms of the oral operating agreement, or where conditions 
upon which the oral agreements were founded change, and/or where events arise that are not 
covered in the oral agreement. 
 The plaintiff has the burden of proof, and this means that plaintiff has the burden of 
proving an operating agreement sufficient to cover the issues to be resolved in this case.  However, 
here, in this case, the only conclusion that can be established by the evidence is that the oral 
agreement was an agreement to sign a written agreement. When Johnson declined to sign the 
written agreement when it was ready, the formation of the LLC fell apart. Crossett attempted to 
keep it together, and tried for a year to get things back on track, but when Johnson continued to 
refuse to sign the written agreement in the fall of 2014, Crossett abandoned the effort to bring 
Johnson on board, and took the entity in a different direction. 
000079
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT – PAGE 17 
 
 I fully accept that Crossett was acting on behalf of both parties when he formed the LLC 
and became its sole member. But Johnson did not become a member upon formation.  Crossett’s 
agreement with Johnson was that he and Johnson would control the LLC when formed by means 
of a written operating agreement. The written agreement was prepared, and both Johnson and 
Crossett approved of its terms. All was ready to go, but Johnson would not sign. 
 There is not a clear answer in the law as to what happens in a situation like this. The 
defense argument is that the formation of the LLC was incomplete and it never actually came into 
being. The plaintiff’s argument seems to be that Johnson was a member from the outset, and that 
the company can go forever on an oral agreement, but without specifying what that agreement is 
or was, other than as to ownership interests, and without any requirement for a written agreement.  
 From a practical standpoint, it does not make any difference which way it goes. Even if I 
accept the plaintiff’s theory, there is no dispute that throughout its life, DTC was managed by 
Crossett. His decision to outsource the sales to Vurv, and his decision to eventually transfer the 
assets to Vurv were business decisions within the scope of his authority as the manager of the 
LLC. Furthermore, by the time he made the decision to transfer the assets, the company was 
technically insolvent. Crossett’s decisions served to satisfy all of the debt remaining in DTC and 
close it out debt free. This is akin to the acts of the directors without the consent of the 
shareholders to liquidate an insolvent corporation, or actions of the liquidating partner to wind up 
an insolvent partnership. All of the money that Crossett had drawn from the company was either in 
reimbursement to him of expenses advanced or as part of the agreed-upon compensation for his 
services as manager. Cousins had been paid all compensation due her and Johnson had been paid 
all the money he had advanced. A small disbursal had been made in July of 2014 to the three 
individuals in the ratio alleged, of 46%, 44%, and 10%, but other than that no other moneys were 
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distributed and no funds or assets are available for distribution under the alleged ownership ratio. 
Under their oral agreement, there is no dispute that Crossett was to work for the venture and have 
sole control over the management of it, Johnson was not. Crossett was to receive a guaranteed 
distribution of $60,000 or $65,000 per year for his direct services to the venture. The exact amount 
of his guaranteed distribution does not matter because the company did not earn enough to pay 
even the lesser amount. There is no obligation on Crossett’s part to return or divide up any of the 
compensation he took, any more than there would be any obligation on the part of Cousins to 
return any part of her salary, since it did not at any time exceed the minimum guaranteed amount.  
 This means that even if the company is deemed to have survived with Johnson and Cousins 
as members, it is an empty shell, with no assets and no liabilities, and no claim upon Crossett to 
account or return anything. If I accept the plaintiffs’ argument, the result would be that there are 
no assets to distribute, and no money due or owing from Crossett. 
 I think the simpler and more correct result is that argued by defense counsel. Therefore, I 
conclude from the facts of this case as found above that the circumstance presented here was the 
imperfect organization of an LLC that was never consummated. Although the plan was for 
common ownership between Johnson and Crossett to be as alleged, with Cousins to be included at 
some stage, and although Crossett formed the company as a single member but with the intent that 
both Johnson and Cousins would be joining him as members as soon as the operating agreement 
was approved and signed, neither Cousins nor Johnson completed the essential step in the 
organization of the LLC necessary for them to become members of it, that being to sign the 
operating agreement. This was not merely an overlooked step in the process, or a step that the 
parties simply did not get around to accomplishing. The preparation and approval of an operating 
agreement was a clear understanding of Johnson and Crossett in their oral agreement. Johnson’s 
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decision not to sign the essential document necessary to the existence of a limited liability 
company in Idaho was a conscious and deliberate decision on his part. 
 Once the written agreement was vetted by counsel and approved by the parties, the oral 
agreements between Crossett and Johnson were insufficient to stand as an oral operating 
agreement, at least with respect to the admission of Cousins and Johnson as members.  Cousins 
was never a party to the oral agreements between Johnson and Crossett. She was not even aware 
of Johnson until she had been employed for some months. By the time she became aware of 
Johnson, the operating agreement had been vetted by counsel and approved by both men, and 
Johnson had already refused to sign. There is no good argument that Cousins could become a 
member of the company without signing the operating agreement.  
 Crossett formed the company as the sole member on behalf of Johnson with the 
expectation that he and Johnson would sign the operating agreement and become members. Under 
Idaho law, “If a limited liability company is to have more than one (1) member upon formation, 
those persons become members as agreed by the persons before the formation of the company.” 
Idaho Code § 30-25-401(b). [Emphasis added.] Here, I think the only conclusion that can be 
drawn from the evidence was that the agreement between Johnson and Crossett was that Johnson, 
and eventually Cousins, would become members upon signing the operating agreement. 
 There might have been some weight to plaintiff’s argument if the operating agreement had 
never been prepared and agreed upon. If the step had actually been overlooked or forgotten, there 
might be some basis to argue that the company continued on based upon the oral agreements as to 
ownership. But when the agreement that is contemplated by the parties and required by law is 
fully prepared, vetted by counsel, approved by both parties, and presented for signature, and then 
one party unilaterally declines to sign, I think that is clear indication that there is not a meeting of 
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the minds on a fundamental step in the formation of the company. Plaintiffs failed to sustain their 
burden of proof that any oral agreements existed that were sufficient to overcome their refusal to 
sign the written operating agreement. 
 Crossett attempted to revive the deal a number of times, until finally, in the fall of 2014, he 
stopped. In the face of Johnson’s intransigent refusal to sign the operating agreement, Crossett had 
no obligation to continue to encourage him to do so, or to wait until he changed his mind. The step 
of making the distribution in July was a unilateral good faith effort on Crossett’s part. He later 
returned all of Johnson’s money, and paid all the compensation otherwise due Cousins. Neither 
have any claim against the company for any money due. Crossett is not obligated to either for any 
claim in this litigation.  
 I conclude that Crossett formed the limited liability company as a single member company, 
with himself as the sole member. Plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof that Johnson was to 
be a member of the LLC from the outset. I conclude that the evidence established that Johnson 
would be added as a member as soon as he signed the operating agreement. The two had agreed 
that Cousins would become a member, but since she was not a party to any of the oral agreements, 
her membership would be dependent upon the terms of the written agreement, which required her 
signature to be effective.  She did not sign, and never became a member.  
 Until such time as additional members were added, the company existed as a single 
member company, meaning that Crossett had full authority to run the company. When Johnson 
and Cousins declined to become members by signing the operating agreement, and in light of the 
company’s worsening financial condition, Crossett was fully within his authority to wind it up by 
transferring all assets to another company in consideration for the extinguishment of debt. 
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 Plaintiffs alleged that Crossett breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. There was no act of Crossett, nor any omission to act, that in any way prevented Johnson 
or Cousins from signing the operating agreement. Plaintiffs have failed to prove any facts which 
would constitute a breach of the implied covenant.  
 Plaintiffs allege that Crossett breached some fiduciary duty owed. However, both plaintiffs 
acknowledged in their testimony that Crossett had caused the company to pay them all money 
actually due them. Cousins testified that she was fully paid for all salary in accordance with the 
company’s agreement for salary, and Johnson testified that he had been repaid for all money he 
had invested at the outset. Johnson did not work for the company at any time, and was never owed 
any money for compensation. Plaintiffs have failed to prove any facts giving rise to any fiduciary 
duty on the part of Crossett to either of them. 
 Plaintiff has failed to prove that Crossett’s withdrawals from the limited liability company 
exceeded the amounts due him as necessary to reimburse him for expenses advanced or draws 
against the guaranteed distribution agreed to by Johnson. Therefore, Crossett is not accountable 
for any excess withdrawals from the company. Crossett is not liable to the plaintiffs, or either of 
them, on any of their complaints in this case. 
 I conclude that this is the most practical solution to apply here.  
Attorney Fees 
 The action is at its foundation a claim for money due from David Crossett. He, 
individually, is entitled to his attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120. 
Directions for Entry of Judgment 
 Based upon the forgoing analysis, it is the order of the Court that judgment be issued in 
this matter as follows: That plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint and that it be dismissed as to 
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all remaining defendants with prejudice. The individual defendant David Crossett is awarded his 
costs and attorney fees, to be determined in later proceedings in accordance with the applicable 
rules of civil procedure. 
 Dated this 1st day of November 2016. 
 
      
      Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BO W. and 
KRYST AL SCHMELLIN G, a married couple, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1513887 
DECLARATION OF COUNSEL 
SETTING FORTH ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
Michelle R. Points declares and affirms as follows pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406: 
1. Affiant. 
I am an attorney with the law firm of Points Law, PLLC, which represents Defendants 
David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC in the captioned case. I 
am licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. This declaration is submitted pursuant to the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of Judgment entered in this case 
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on November 1, 2016, wherein the Comi held that Mr. Crossett was entitled to his attorney fees 
and costs incurred in defending this action. It is intended to comply with provisions ofldaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54, including but not limited to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(5) 
and 54(e)(5). I have directed all invoices in this matter to Mr. Crossett. 
2. Basis of Declaration. 
The matters set forth in this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge, the work 
records of my law firm, and a review of those records made by me and other persons with 
knowledge. The records were made contemporaneously with the events set forth in the records, 
were made in the ordinary course, and were regularly kept by Points Law, PLLC, counsel for 
Plaintiff. 
3. Fees and Costs Claimed. 
Accompanying this affidavit is Exhibit A, which itemizes the requested attorney's fees 
organized in a manner that details the nature and amount of attorney's fees sought by Mr. 
Crossett and incurred by this firm, based upon Mr. Crossett having successfully defended against 
Plaintiffs' claims. In addition to the fees contained in Exhibit A, I will spend approximately 2 
hours in preparing this declaration, a notice of hearing and presenting argument at a hearing 
anticipating opposition to this declaration. I am familiar with the fact of, and the necessity for, 
such attorney's fees and costs having been incurred in this case. Such fees and costs were 
actually, necessarily, and reasonably incurred. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the 
items are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(5). The attorney's fees claimed are for work actually performed in this action and 
represent time that relates to defending Plaintiffs' claims. The costs are claimed in compliance 
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with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l ). Mr. Crossett is entitled to attorney fees under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code § 12-120 as he is the prevailing paiiy. 
4. Parties Against Whom Mr. Crossett Claims Fees and Costs. 
Mr. Crossett seeks recovery of fees and costs from both Plaintiffs, Mr. Johnson and Ms. 
Cousins, joint and severally. 
5. Basis for Claim Against Plaintiff. 
The basis for Mr. Crossett's claim arises from the above referenced decision entered in 
this case. 
6. Factors Supporting the Reasonableness of Mr. Crossett's Claim for Attorney Fees. 
Factors that the Court should consider in determining the reasonableness of Mr. 
Crossett' s claim for attorney fees are set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3 ). Those 
factors are individually discussed in the following paragraphs of this declaration. 
7. The Time and Labor Required. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(A) provides that the Comi shall consider the time 
and labor required. Mr. Crossett attempted to address the issues in this case only on an as needed 
basis, to spare the expenditure of unnecessary time and resources. Given the nature of the 
claims, only necessary discovery was conducted in the form of written discovery and 
depositions. Research of applicable law was required to prepare all pre-trial submissions and 
present the facts, evidence and legal theories during trial. 
8. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3 )(B) provides that the Court shall consider the 
novelty and difficulty of the questions. As discussed in the previous paragraph, it was necessary 
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to review necessary documents and recordings, as well as research applicable law to evaluate and 
prepare for trial. 
9. The Skill, Experience and Ability of the Attorney. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(C) provides that the Court shall consider the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney in 
the particular field of law. The lawyer primarily involved in this case myself, Michelle R Points, 
ISB No. 6224, Principal. I have the requisite skill and experience and properly and efficiently 
handled this case. 
] 0. The Prevailing Charges. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3 )(D) provides that the Corni shall consider the 
prevailing charges for like work. I charged $230.00 per hour for the defense in this case. 
Throughout the course of this litigation, I believe that the charges billed for by me have been at 
the prevailing charges for like work. 
11. Mandatory Costs. 
Mandatory costs, as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(C) are as follows: 
Cost for preparation of trial exhibits: $43 .87 
Charges for reporting or transcribing: $811.20 
(Q&A Court Reporting and M&M Court reporting; depositions of David and Jill Johnson and 
Tessa Cousins) 
Filing fee for Answer: $136.00 
Total: $991.07 
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12. Factors Supporting the Reasonableness of Mr. Crossett's Claim for Costs. 
Mr. Crossett is claiming costs as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54( d)(l )(C). 
SUMMARY OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED for Points Law, PLLC: 
Attorney fees: 
Mandatory costs (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) 
Total 
DATED this 8th day ofNovember, 2016 
$18,216.00 
$ 991.07 
$19,207.07 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
By: /s/ Michelle R. Points 
Michelle R. Points 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance 
Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day ofNovember, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing DECLARATION OF COUNSEL SETTING FORTH ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS by filing said pleading using iCourts! wherein the following were served 
electronically: 
James F. Jacobson 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
/s/ Michelle R. Points 
Michelle R. Points 
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Detailed Time Report 
EXHIBIT 
Timeframe 
Total 
08/17/2015 - 10/20/2016 
77.20 Billable Hours 
Client 
Project 
Task 
Staff 
OTC Group LLC 
Crossett Johnson litigation 
All Tasks 
I A 
0.00 Uninvoiced Billable Hours 
08/17/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
08/19/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
08/20/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
08/25/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/08/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/10/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/14/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/15/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/18/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/21/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
All Staff 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Draft answer with affirmative defenses. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with client re edits to Answer; edit and revise the same; draft motion to disqualify counsel; draft first set of 
interrogatories, requests for production and requests for admission. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
1.50 
1.50 
2.70 
2.10 a 
1.50 
1.50 
Revise and edit answer, motion to disqualify counsel; draft notices of deposition duces cecum for D and J Johnson; draft notice of 
service. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Call with court clerk re hearing on motion for disqualification; draft notice of hearing and file and serve the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with court clerk and client and draft amended notices of deposition duces tecum for D. and J. Johnson. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.30 
0.30 
0.30 
0.30 
1.10 
1.10 
Meet with client re depositions of Johnson, potential settlement and case strategy; review objection to motion to disqualify and 
forward the same to client and vacating hearing on the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin 
Draft, file and serve notice of vacating hearing. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin 
Michelle Points 
Michelle Points 
0.30 
0.30 
0.30 
o.30 a 
Call to court clerk re vacating hearing; exchange emails with counsel re vacated hearing, scheduled depositions and settlement 
conference. 
0.20 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.20 a 
Exchange emails with counsel re discovery requests and responses. 
0.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 a 
Exchange emails with counsel re deposition schedule; brief review of discovery responses and call with client re the same. 
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09/22/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/23/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/24/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/28/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
09/30/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
10/06/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
10/11/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
10/14/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
10/15/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
10/16/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
10/18/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
10/20/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
1.30 
1.30 
Exchange emails with court reporter, counsel and client re scheduling of deposition; draft second amended notice of deposition duces 
cecum; exchange emails with K. Cameron re information on D. Johnson; exchange emails with client re the same; exchange emails 
and calls with client re deposition questions, strategy going forward and related matters. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.50 
0.50 
Draft, file and se,ve request for trial setting; exchange emails with client re deposition scheduling; exchange emails with counsel re the 
same and potential protective order; email client re the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.50 
0.50 
Exchange emails with client re description of knowledge of potential witnesses; email counsel re the same; call with client re additional 
Johnson information, case strategy and related matters. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with client re litigation matters. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with client re notification to counsel re facts on Johnson's family; call with client re the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Call with client re no settlement offer and related matters. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with court reporter re upcoming depositions and forward amended notices to the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Prepare for depositions of Johnson. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.20 
0.20 
0.30 
0.30 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
2.90 
2.90 
0.60 
0.60 
Call with client re tomorrow's depositions of Johnson and several related matters; final preparation for tomorrow's depositions. 
4.80 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 4.80 0 
Meet with clients and conduct deposition of D. and J. Johnson; exchange emails with client re provisions in operating agreement and 
related matters. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.50 
0.50 
Review several emails from client re case facts and strategy for proceeding; email client re the same; review notice of scheduling 
conference and available trial dates. 
0.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 0 
Exchange emails with counsel re trial date, discovery and related matters; email client re the same. 
000094
10/23/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
10/30/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
11/11/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
11/16/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
i i/17 /2015 
OTC Group LLC 
i 1/19/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
12/07/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
12/10/2015 
OTC Group LLC 
01/06/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
01/11/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
01/12/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
02/03/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
02/08/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
0.20 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.20 
Exchange emails with client re potential depositions of certain witnesses. 
0.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 
Call with client re bifurcation of trial; draft email to counsel re the same. 
1.10 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 1.10 
Email counsel re discovery requests; begin research on bifurcation motion and begin outline of motion and memorandum. 
0.90 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.90 
Continue to draft responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests; email client the same. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Review email from client and revise and edit discovery responses. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Compile file and serve discovery responses and notice of service. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Review supplemental discovery requests and begin draft of response. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Exchange emails with counsel re responses to discovery requests and response to settlement offer. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Review correspondence from counsel re meet and confer on specific discovery requests; exchange emails with S. Cozakas re court 
reporter on earlier depositions. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Review meet and confer Jetter; begin draft of response and exchange emails and ca/ls with client re the same. 
0.30 
0.30 
0.80 
a 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points o.ao a 
Continue to draft and edit Jetter to counsel for Johnson in response to meet and confer letter; exchange emails with client re case 
status and strategy for proceeding with potential settlement or dismissal. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Review scheduling order and email client re potential mediation. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.20 
0.20 a 
0.50 
0.50 
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02/10/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
02/24/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
02/25/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
02/29/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
03/04/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
03/07/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
03/25/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
04/21/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
06/01/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
06/02/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
06/13/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
06/15/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
Review several pleadings filed by Plaintiff; review scheduling order re amendment deadline; call with client re the same and accounting 
issues. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Review additional pleadings filed by Plaintiff; review repository re hearing information and email counsel re the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.50 
0,50 
0.30 
0.30 
Review several motions filed by Johnson and email counsel for Johnson re motion to intervene and hearing; confirm with court 
repository. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Draft memorandums in opposition to Johnson's motion to compel, motion to consolidate and motion to amend complaint. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange several emails with counsel re motion to intervene pleadings and hearing and related matters. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with counsel re trial setting; review and outline response to Johnson's reply pleadings. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Review Johnson reply on motion to intervene. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Review proposed order on motions decided from bench prepared by counsel for Johnson; email counsel re the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with client re upcoming trial and related matters. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with clients re service of summons and several related trial issues. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
1.60 
1.60 
0.30 
0.30 
0.50 
0.50 
0.20 
0.20 
0.30 
0.30 
0.20 
0.20 
0.40 
0.40 
0.50 
0.50 
Exchange emails and call with client re service of amended complaint; review file for notes on amendment motion; exchange emails 
with counsel re service of complaints and stipulation re dismissal of Blak and individuals. 
0.50 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.50 8 
Review protective order forwarded by counsel for Johnson; exchange emails with counsel and client re the same; email counsel re 
final version of amended complaint that was served. 
0.50 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.50 8 
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06/16/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
06/17/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
06/20/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
06/23/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/07/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/08/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/12/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/15/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/17/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/18/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/19/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/20/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
07/21/2016 
Review and execute stipulation for protective order; exchange emails with client and counsel re production of Quickbooks documents 
and request for final version of amended complaints. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Exchange emails with client re QuickBook reports and review timelines for lay witness disclosure. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.30 
0.30 
0.30 
0.30 
Review draw report produced by client; exchange emails with client re the same; email counsel PL report for OTC through 2015. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Exchange emails with counsel and client re deposition scheduling. 
0.20 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.20 
Review and calendar notice of deposition and forward the same to client. 
0.20 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.20 
Review correspondence and email counsel for copy of served Amended Complaint. 
0.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 
Begin draft of answer to first amended complaint; email client re the same. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Review amended notice of deposition duces tecum; email document to counsel; email client re the same. 
0.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 
Review scheduling order and discovery responses and email client re lay witness disclosure. 
0.20 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.20 iii 
Exchange emails with client re deposition scheduling and related issues. 
1.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 1.30 a 
Exchange emails with client and counsel re deposition and production issues; draft answer to first amended complaint with affirmative 
defenses and Jay witness disclosure; file and serve. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 iii 
Exchange emails with client re deposition; email counsel re the same; ca// to counsel re scheduling issues with deposition. 
0.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 iii 
Prepare materials for deposition; email and call to counsel re deposition scheduling; email client re the same. 
3.00 
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OTC Group LLC 
08/01/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
08/i0/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
08/ii/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
08/16/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
08/17/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
08/30/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
09/06/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
09/07/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
09/12/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
09/14/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
09/19/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
09/23/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
09/28/2016 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 3.oo a 
Meet with client and attend his deposition. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin 
Call with client re production of electronic Quickbook files. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin 
Michelle Points 
Michelle Points 
0.20 
0.20 
0.50 
0.50 
Exchange emails and calls with client re download of financial records from QB, production of financial records, and related matters. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
0.30 
0.30 
Review discovery requests and order on motion to compel re documents requested; email client re production of QB reports. 
0.20 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.20 
Exchange calls and emails with counsel re potential settlement offer. 
0.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 
Call with counsel re settlement offer; exchange emails with client and counsel re the same. 
0.20 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.20 
Review letter and subpoenas from Johnson counsel; exchange emails with client re the same. 
1.10 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 1.10 
6 
6 
Draft motion in !imine; review faxes and subpoenas for counsel for Johnson; exchange emails with client and accountant re subpoena. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Exchange emails with counsel and client re potential mediation; call with counsel re the same. 
0.50 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.50 6 
Draft motion to bifurcate trial and notice of hearing for this motion and motion in liming; email court clerk re the same. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 6 
Call with client re preparation for upcoming trial and several related matters. 
0.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 6 
Brief review of materials submitted by counsel re supplemental discovery responses and forward the same to client for review; ca/I with 
client re the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation 
Draft pretrial memorandum. 
Admin Michelle Points 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
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OTC Group LLC 
09/29/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
09/30/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
10/04/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
10/07/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
10/08/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
10/10/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
i0/11/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
10/12/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
i0/14/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
10/15/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
10/16/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
10/17/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.40 
Review plaintiffs' response to motions in liming and motion to bifurcate and pretrial motion. 
0.60 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points o.60 a 
Begin draft of witness list, exhibit list and jury instructions 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
1.50 
1.50 
Continue to draft witness and exhibit lists and jury instructions; outline argument for today's hearing; attend pretrial conference; call 
with client re the same. 
0.20 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.20 
Contact respective court reporters to get depositions of Johnson and Cousins. 
0.30 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.30 
Exchange emails with court clerk re use of Plan B judge and pretrial filings; email client re the same and related matters. 
0.50 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.50 
Research case law on operating agreements and fiduciary duty. 
7.40 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 7.40 
Continue to review cases, depositions, instruction and draft proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; exchange emails with 
client throughout day re the same. 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 
Continue to draft and edit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; efi/e and serve on court clerk. 
2.10 
2.10 
0.90 
a 
a 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points o.90 a 
Review Plaintiffs proposed findings and conclusions; exchange emails with client re the same; calls with client re the same and trial 
preparation. 
3.50 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 3.50 
Prepare exhibits and notebooks; begin drafting of questions for witnesses and continue to review deposition testimony. 
5.00 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 5.00 
Meet with client in preparation for trial; finish drafting witness questions and preparing exhibits for trial (2 hours written off). 
0.70 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 0.70 
Continue to work on witness questions; exchange emails with client re the same. 
6.50 
Crossett Johnson litigation Admin Michelle Points 6.50 
a 
a 
a 
000099
i0/18/2016 
OTC Group LLC 
Meet with client and attend trial day one; revise direct examination questions and closing statement (1 hour written off). 
Crossett Johnson litigation 
Attend trial day 2. 
Admin Michelle Points 
Total 
2.50 
2.50 
77.20 
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James F. Jacobson [ISB No. 7011] 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID  83714 
Telephone: (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile: (208) 477-5210 
Email:  james@jjlawidaho.com 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
 
 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
 
 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
 
                                       Plaintiffs, 
 
vs.  
 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BO W. 
and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married 
couple, 
 
                         Defendants. 
 
 CASE NO.  CV OC  1513887 
 
 
 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’ 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 
 
  
COME NOW the above-named Plaintiffs, DAVID JOHNSON and TESSA COUSINS, 
by and through their counsel of record Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC, and respectfully submits 
this Objection to Defendants’ Request for Attorney’s Fees, based upon the following points of 
law and authority. 
 
Electronically Filed
11/22/2016 4:45:50 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk
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OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES – Page 2 
DISCUSSION 
A. Legal Standards on Attorney Fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Under Idaho law, the prevailing party in a civil action may be awarded reasonable 
attorney’s fee when that action is brought to recover on “an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law.”  
I.C. § 12-120(3).  This section of the Idaho Code defines the term commercial transaction “to 
mean all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.”  Id.  “It has long 
been held that ‘[t]he critical test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen 
of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on 
which the party is attempting to recover.’”  Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 
Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001) (quoting Bingham v. Montane Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 
420, 426, 987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1999)) (emphasis added).  An action to enforce a statutory 
penalty or right is not a commercial transaction.  Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 
631, 903 P.2d 1321, 1328 (1995); Gumprect v. Doyle, 128 Idaho 242, 245, 912 P.2d 610, 613 
(1995).  Therefore, attorney’s fees sought under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) are unavailable “when 
the claim is based on a statutory provision, even when the underlying action depends on 
contract.”  Shay v. Cesler, 132 Idaho 585, 588, 977 P.2d 199, 202 (1999); L&W Supply Corp. v. 
Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 747, 40 P.3d 96, 105 (2002).  
B. There is no commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) in this case. 
 In Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, the court reasoned that the issue of accounting and 
winding up of the partnership affairs, and a distribution of partnership assets was not a 
commercial transaction because the basis of plaintiff’s recovery was enforcement of a statutory 
000101
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES – Page 3 
penalty.  Kelly, 127 Idaho at 631, 912 P.2d at 1328.  Similarly, in Gumprecht v. Doyle, the court 
found that a shareholder’s suit was based on statutory penalties or rights, and as such was not a 
commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) making the award of attorney’s fees 
inappropriate.  Gumprecht, 128 Idaho at 245, 912 P.2d at 613.  Because the basis of recovery in 
each action was statutory, the transactions were not considered commercial transactions under 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) making an award of attorney’s fees inappropriate.  This was in spite of 
the fact that each underlying action depended on a contractual relationship.  Kelly, 127 Idaho at 
630-31, 912 P.2d at 1327-28 (showing that the underlying action depended on the existence of a 
partnership agreement); Gumprecht, 128 Idaho at 242-43, 912 P.2d at 610-11 (showing that the 
underlying action depended on the contractual relationship between a shareholder and the 
corporation). 
 Similar to the Kelly and Gumprecht, the action in this case depends upon a contractual 
relationship—members in a limited liability company.  However, also similar to Kelly and 
Gumprecht, each claim in this case is based on a statutory theory of recovery.  Plaintiffs in this 
case claim that Defendant Crossett (1) breached his duty of loyalty set out in Idaho Code § 30-
25-407(a); (2) breached his duty of care set out in Idaho Code § 30-25-409(c); (3) breached the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing set out in Idaho Code § 30-25-409(d); (4) did not 
properly make distributions to Plaintiffs as fellow members of DTC Group, LLC as required 
under Idaho Code § 30-25-404(d); and (5) improperly attempted to expel Plaintiffs as members 
in violation of Idaho Code § 30-25-602.  The theory of recovery for each of these is an action to 
enforce a statutory penalty or right.  Therefore, this case does not constitute a commercial 
transaction within the meaning of Idaho Code § 12-120(3), even though the underlying action 
depends on the contractual relationship between the parties as members of DTC Group, LLC.  
000102
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES – Page 4 
Consequently, an award of attorney’s fees to the defendants under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is 
inappropriate and the court should deny Defendants’ Request for Attorney’s Fees. 
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2016. 
       JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
 
 
       By: /s/ James F. Jacobson 
            James F. Jacobson, of the firm 
            Attorney for Plaintiffs 
  
000103
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES – Page 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of November, 2016, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document(s) was served upon: 
 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
 
 
[   ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[   ] Hand-Delivered 
[   ] Overnight Mail 
[X]        iCourt/email 
[   ] Facsimile  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 DATED this 22nd day of November, 2016. 
 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
 
 
 
By: /s/ James F. Jacobson 
      James F. Jacobson, of the firm 
          Attorneys for Plaintiffs                          
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Electronically Filed
11/23/2016 3:32:27 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk
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James F. Jacobson [!SB No. 701 IJ 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID 83714 
Telephone: (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile: (208) 477-5210 
Email: iames@,jj\awidaho.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DA YID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BOW. 
and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married 
couple, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
CASE NO. CV OC 1513887 
AFFIDAVIT OF DA YID JOHNSON IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO FOR NEW TRIAL 
DAVID JOHNSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Your Affiant is over the age of eighteen and is competent to testify as to the matters 
contained herein based on his own personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 1 
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2. This Affidavit is submitted in support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Grant a New Trial and 
contains information to the best of Plaintiff Johnson's knowledge. 
3. At the trial of this matter, the court refused to acknowledge the fact that Defendants 
admitted in their pleadings that both myself and Plaintiff Cousins were members of DTC 
Group, LLC since its founding. The court was made aware of this admission by 
Defendants through my attorney of record, James F. Jacobson. Yet the court did not 
address this admission in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
4. Furthermore, the court was made aware of the facts surrounding the formation of DTC 
Group, LLC, all of which support the Defendants' admission that both myself and 
Plaintiff Cousins were members of DIC Group, LLC since its founding. Particularly that 
Defendant Crossett did in fact make the required filings with the office of the Secretary 
of State on behalf of the company that the three of us had formed together, which was 
testified to by myself, Plaintiff Cousins, and Defendant Crossett. 
5. Defendant Crossett testified at trial that he treated Plaintiff Cousins and myself as 
members of DTC Group, LLC. This treatment included Plaintiff Cousins and my being 
paid distributions based on our ownership interests, as shown in Exhibit 1 admitted at 
trial. Plaintiff Cousins and I testified that we were members ofDTC Group, LLC since its 
inception. However, the court ignored all of these facts. Defendant Crossett testified at 
trial regarding text messages exchanged between me and him wherein I asserted my 
ownership interest in DIC Group, LLC and Defendant Crossett did not dispute my 
statements regarding my ownership interest. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL~ 2 
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FURTHER, your affiant sayeth not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of November, 2016. 
NO ARY PUBLIC F IDAHO 
Resident at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires: 1/5/18 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of November, 2016, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing documents was served upon: 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[X] iCourt/email 
[ J Facsimile 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016. 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
By 
es F. Jacobson, the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 4 
, 
Electronically Filed
11/23/2016 3:32:27 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk
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James F. Jacobson [JSB No. 7011] 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID 83714 
Telephone: (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile: (208) 477-52I0 
Email: jamcsfu1i.jl_awidaho.con1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DA YID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BOW. 
and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married 
couple, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
CASE NO. CV OC 1513887 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES F. 
JACOBSON IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
JAMES F. JACOBSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That he is the attorney of record for Plaintiffs David Johnson and Tessa Cousins in the 
above-entitled matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES F. JACOBSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL- 1 
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2. At the trial of this matter, Defendant Crossett testified that he was given a salary by DTC 
Group, LLC, which was provided him in compensation for his services as Manager. He 
was provided Exhibit H during his testimony, which is a profit and loss statement for 
DTC Group, LLC for the year 2013, 2014, and 2015. In his testimony, he indicated that 
the line item in Exhibit H labeled "Net Income" was his salary for each year. 
3. However, this testimony is in direct opposition to his testimony given at his deposition in 
which he indicated that his salary was a part of the line item labeled "'Payroll Expenses," 
and that "Net Income" was a line item separate and apart from his salary. Exhibit 1, p. 
22. In his deposition, Defendant Crossett stated he did not know why the "Net Income" 
line showed approximately $60,000. Exhibit 1, p. 25. I have attached Defendant 
Crossett's deposition to this affidavit and labeled it Exhibit 1. 
4. Defendant Crossett's testimony in his deposition is in direct correlation with Plaintiff 
Cousins' testimony at trial, in which she also stated that Defendant Crossett's salary was 
reflected in the line item labeled "Payroll Expenses," and not in "Net Income." 
FURTHER, your affiant sayeth not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of November, 2016. 
,,,,11111,,,, 
,,~ ~ K. /J ,,,,, 
...... b..'<->.:.········· '<,(;:'/_ ,, $~, / .... -v-:. 
:: l ... ~ 
:E f 4)TAf?J- \ ~ 
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;. !J' \ '°Ua\.\C.. _; o ~ 
---~ ',,>.•.. ····~ ,:, 
'> .,,,,,, •• - ' 
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''''""'''' 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Resident at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires allfU[t l3,i){}I 7 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES F. JACOBSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL- 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of November, 2016, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing documents was served upon: 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ l 
[ l 
M 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016. 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
iCourt/email 
Facsimile 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES F. JACOBSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 3 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
     THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual,    )
and TESSA COUSINS, an individual )
                                 )
             Plaintiffs,         )
                                 )
vs.                              )  Case No. CV OC 1513887
                                 )
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual,   )
SCOTT H. LEE, an individual,     )
DRUG TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP,   )
LLC, an Idaho limited liability  )
company, VURV, LLC, an Idaho     )
limited liability company, BO W. )
and KRYSTAL SCHEMELLING, a       )
married couple,                  )
                                 )
             Defendants.         )
_________________________________)
               DEPOSITION OF DAVID CROSSETT
                       July 21, 2016
                       Boise, Idaho
Reported by:
Andrea J. Couch, CSR #716, RDR, CRR, CRC
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                DEPOSITION OF DAVID CROSSETT
         BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of
  DAVID CROSSETT was taken by the Plaintiffs at the law
  offices of Jacobson & Jacobson, located at 7655 West
  Riverside Drive, Boise, Idaho, before Associated
  Reporting & Video, Andrea J. Couch, Court Reporter and
  Notary Public in and for the County of Ada, State of
  Idaho, on Thursday, the 21st day of July, 2016,
  commencing at the hour of 9:30 a.m. in the
  above-entitled matter.
  APPEARANCES:
  For the Plaintiffs:  JACOBSON & JACOBSON
                       By:  James F. Jacobson, Esq.
                       7655 West Riverside Drive
                       Boise, Idaho 83714
                       Telephone:  (208) 884-1995
                       Facsimile:  (208) 477-5210
                       james@jjlawidaho.com
  For the Defendants:  POINTS LAW
                       By:  Michelle R. Points, Esq.
                       910 West Main, Suite 222
                       Boise, Idaho 83702
                       Telephone:  (208) 287-3216
                       Facsimile:  (208) 336-2088
                       mpoints@pointslaw.com
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[Page 20]
1 have as well as you.
2       Q.   Well, that's not quite my question.
3 Maybe you didn't understand.  Let me ask that
4 again.
5            Are there other financial records of
6 DTC Group that your accountant has that are not
7 Deposition Exhibit 1?
8       A.   Not that I'm aware of, no.
9       Q.   So if I requested from Rachel financial
10 documents related to DTC Group, the only thing
11 she's going to give me is Deposition Exhibit 1?
12       A.   Correct.
13       Q.   What happened to the other financial
14 records of DTC Group?
15       A.   I don't know.  It was a couple of years
16 ago, and we've moved offices twice.
17       Q.   And you have no recollection of what you
18 did with those financial records?
19       A.   I don't.
20       MS. POINTS:  Can I interject?  I'm not sure
21 that David is understanding the question.
22       MR. JACOBSON:  Okay.
23       MS. POINTS:  Just a few follow-up questions.
24       MR. JACOBSON:  Sure.
25       MS. POINTS:  You provided financial
[Page 22]
1       A.   Yes.
2       Q.   Okay.  All right.
3            But you don't have any record of who
4 your employees were or your sales force was in
5 2014?
6       A.   Not outside of QuickBooks.
7       Q.   You were paying yourself a salary in
8 2014?
9       A.   Yes.
10       Q.   What was your salary?
11       A.   I -- I don't know exactly, but I think
12 it's roughly about $60,000.
13       Q.   Okay.
14       A.   And that information was provided to
15 you.
16       Q.   Okay.  I appreciate that.
17            And then the remainder of that payroll
18 expense went to these other 14 employees?
19       A.   Correct.
20       Q.   Were your salespeople being paid on a
21 commission basis or were they being paid in some
22 other fashion?
23       A.   Salespeople were being paid on
24 commission.
25       Q.   Okay.  Besides yourself and the
[Page 21]
1 information to Ms. Pulliam, and she kept the
2 QuickBooks for you?
3       THE WITNESS:  Right.
4       MS. POINTS:  So she would have had access to
5 those QuickBooks programs, correct?
6       THE WITNESS:  Yes.
7       MS. POINTS:  And she used those QuickBooks
8 programs to, for instance, prepare your tax returns
9 for DTC?
10       THE WITNESS:  Right.
11       MS. POINTS:  And your K-1s, if you took any
12 distributions?
13       THE WITNESS:  Correct.
14       MS. POINTS:  So she would have those
15 financial records?
16       THE WITNESS:  Oh, yes.
17       Q.   (BY MR. JACOBSON) So she still has the
18 QuickBooks file?
19       A.   Yes.  I'm sorry.  Yes.
20       MR. JACOBSON:  Thank you, Counsel.  I
21 appreciate the clarification.
22       MS. POINTS:  Yeah.
23       Q.   (BY MR. JACOBSON) So we could get
24 financial records related to DTC Group from
25 Ms. Pulliam?
[Page 23]
1 salespeople, did DTC Group have any other employees
2 in 2014?
3       A.   Yes.
4       Q.   Who?
5       A.   There were administrators that did
6 things on the back end.
7            When you're asking "who," are you asking
8 what they did or names of who they are?
9       Q.   "Who" is their names.  "What" is what
10 they did.
11       A.   We had many different employees.  We
12 went through a lot.  Again, it would be in
13 QuickBooks.
14       Q.   Are you telling me that in terms of your
15 administrative people, you had a significant amount
16 of turnover in one year?
17       A.   We did.
18       Q.   Do you know how many administrative
19 people you employed in 2014?
20       A.   I don't know the number exactly, but it
21 could be as high as 10 or 12.
22       Q.   And not all at one time but at varying
23 times depending on your high rate of turnover?
24       A.   Correct.
25       Q.   The number for payroll expense drops
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[Page 24]
1 down to minus $29.13 in 2015.
2            Can you explain that?
3       A.   Yes.  When DTC no longer had employees
4 at the end of the year.
5       Q.   So DTC Group did have employees in 2015
6 of some kind?
7       A.   I don't believe so.  I was the only
8 employee of DTC Group for 2015.
9       Q.   You were the only one?
10       A.   Correct.
11       Q.   For the entire year?  You laid everybody
12 off in December of 2013?  Excuse me, 2014.
13       A.   All of those -- all of those employees
14 moved to another company out of DTC Group.
15       Q.   What company did they move to?
16       A.   To Vurv, V-u-r-v.
17       Q.   Okay.  Why did they do that?
18       A.   Because DTC was failing.
19       Q.   What do you mean by "failing"?
20       A.   It could not pay its bills.
21       Q.   Let's look on page 2 of Deposition
22 Exhibit 1.
23       A.   Uh-huh.
24       Q.   You're showing a net profit of
25 $63,471.75.
[Page 26]
1       A.   That's my understanding.
2       Q.   Okay.  Any other understanding besides
3 that?
4       A.   No.
5       Q.   But it's your testimony that DTC Group's
6 debt load was too high for it to continue?
7       A.   Correct.
8       Q.   And so your plan was to shutter the
9 company and open up a new company that did
10 essentially the same thing as DTC Group?
11       A.   No, that was not the plan.
12       Q.   What was the plan?
13       A.   DTC Group could not pay its bills.  We
14 were being sued, investigated; had a lot of
15 problems.  Dave Johnson wanted nothing to do with
16 the company, refused to sign the operating
17 agreement after multiple requests.
18       Q.   You already said that.  I appreciate
19 that.
20       A.   I just --
21            It's part of what it looked like in
22 September.
23       Q.   Okay.
24       A.   And then I had met an individual who had
25 experience in call centers, and we talked about
[Page 25]
1            Is that correct?
2       A.   That's what it says.
3       Q.   And how does that equate to your
4 statement of, "DTC Group couldn't pay its bills"?
5       A.   It carried almost $200,000 in debt from
6 the legal fees.
7       Q.   Why then is it showing a net profit of
8 over $60,000?
9       A.   I don't know.  But you're looking at a
10 cash basis profit and loss, and DTC is accrual
11 basis.
12       Q.   Well --
13       A.   I'm not an accountant, so I don't know,
14 but I can tell you the reality of the checks that I
15 wrote.
16       Q.   Do you understand the difference between
17 cash and accrual?
18       A.   A little bit.
19       Q.   What is your understanding of the
20 difference between a cash basis accounting and an
21 accrual basis accounting?
22       A.   Cash basis shows you what is there in
23 cash right now.  Accrual shows you -- it takes into
24 account what you may owe.
25       Q.   That's your understanding?
[Page 27]
1 starting a company to sell lots of call center
2 products.
3       Q.   This was Scott Lee?
4       A.   Scott Lee.
5       Q.   Okay.  Go ahead.
6       A.   So we started Vurv as a call center to
7 sell multiple types of products, and DTC was one of
8 the many products that we could offer.
9            And as DTC was failing, we -- I moved
10 the employees over to Vurv, and we kept DTC open to
11 pay its debts.
12       Q.   What did you use to pay DTC Group's
13 debts?  Where did those funds come from?
14       A.   Those funds --
15            Initial debts came from DTC, and then
16 those funds came from Vurv.
17       Q.   Why did Vurv pay DTC Group's debts?
18       A.   That was the agreement I had.
19       Q.   Is there a written agreement between
20 DTC Group and Vurv where Vurv assumed the debts of
21 DTC Group?
22       A.   No.
23       Q.   Is there a promissory note between Vurv
24 and DTC Group where Vurv loaned money to DTC Group
25 in exchange for a promise to pay?
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9:54 PM 
06/15/16 Profit & Loss 
Cash Basis January 2013 through December 2015 
Jan - Dec 13 Jan - Dec 14 
Ordinary Income/Expense 
Income 197,889.56 1,099,445.68 
Cost of Goods Sold 
Cost of Goods Sold 21,221 .24 163,834.26 
Total COGS 21 ,221 .24 163,834.26 
Gross Profit 176,668.32 935,611 .42 
Expense 
Automobile Expense 0.00 1,632.64 
Bank Fees 0.00 3.21 
Continuing Education 0.00 545.00 
Depreciation Expense 4,320.00 3,480.00 
Dues & Subscriptions 75.00 672.00 
Employee Insurance 0.00 283.98 
Faxing Service 48.95 118.07 
Insurance Expense 0.00 1,011 .76 
Interest Expense 7.30 508.56 
Licenses & Permits 0.00 30.00 
Marketing Expenses 214.29 4,070.75 
Meals and Entertainment 2,512.34 4,330.89 
Merchant Account Fees 4,789.21 37,066.79 
Office Supplies 3,917.81 14,424.35 
Outside Services 25.00 354,694.14 
Payroll Expenses 61 ,737.30 277,240.12 
Postage/Mailing Costs 2,905.36 11 ,874.62 
Professional & Legal 179.00 119,505.54 
Refunds to us 0.00 0.00 
Rent Expense 6,150.00 19,235.00 
Repairs and Maintenance 1,539.64 3,451 .20 
RV exp 0.00 0.00 
Technology 21,025.19 17,001 .99 
Travel Expense 1,808.39 977.67 
Jan - Dec 15 
800,486.42 
320,586.97 
320,586.97 
479,899.45 
340.78 
556.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
133.47 
587.52 
640.76 
0.00 
74.72 
556.46 
16,140.79 
15,382.33 
235,449.39 
-29.13 
27,918.87 
191,825.88 
-13.95 
2,750.00 
947.89 
248.00 
8,707. 16 
695.48 
TOTAL 
2,097,821 .66 
505,642.47 
505,642.47 
1,592,179.19 
1,973.42 
560.15 
545.00 
7,800.00 
747.00 
283.98 
300.49 
1,599.28 
1,156.62 
30.00 
4,359.76 
7,399.69 
57,996.79 
33,724.49 
590,168.53 
338,948.29 
42,698.85 
311 ,51 0.42 
-13.95 
28,135.00 
5,938.73 
248.00 
46,734.34 
3,481 .54 
EX NO. l ( ( oy;;-= ......... w"!"'.,r----= 
DATE =7,IJ.-fj/lfl 
ASSOCIATED 
REPORTING & VIDEO 
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06/15/16 
Cash Basis 
Profit & Loss 
January 2013 through December 2015 
Jan - Dec 13 Jan - Dec 14 
Uncategorized Expense 0.00 0.00 
Uncategorized Expenses (deleted 351.02 0.00 
Total Expense 111,605.80 872,158.28 
Net Ordinary Income 65,062.52 63,453.14 
Other Income/Expense 
Other Income 0.00 18.61 
Other Expense -2,581.34 0.00 
Net other Income 2,581.34 18.61 
Net Income 67,643.86 63,471.75 
Jan - Dec 15 TOTAL 
2,934.04 2,934.04 
0.00 351.02 
505,847.40 1,489,611.48 
-25,947.95 102,567.71 
3.64 22.25 
0.00 -2,581.34 
3.64 2,603.59 
-25,944.31 105,171.30 
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                 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF IDAHO  )
                )  ss.
COUNTY OF ADA   )
   I, ANDREA J. COUCH, Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, do hereby
certify:
     That prior to being examined, the witness named in
the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to testify
to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth;
     That said deposition was taken down by me in
shorthand at the time and place therein named and
thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction,
and that the foregoing transcript contains a full, true
and verbatim record of said deposition.
     I further certify that I have no interest in the
event of the action.
     WITNESS my hand and seal this 28th day of July,
2016.
                            _________________________
                              ANDREA J. COUCH
                              RDR and Notary
                              Public in and for the
                              State of Idaho.
My Commission Expires:  2-14-17
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James F. Jacobson [ISB No. 7011]  
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID 83714 
Telephone: (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile: (208) 477-5210  
Email:  james@jjlawidaho.com 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
                  
 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
 
                                       Plaintiffs, 
 
vs.  
 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BO W. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married 
couple, 
 
                         Defendants.  
 
 CASE NO. CV OC 1513887 
 
 
 
 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
 
 
 COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiffs, DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual in the above matter, by and through their counsel of record, 
Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC, and pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(B), 
59(a)(1)(G), and 59(a)(1)(H) moves that this court grant a new trial on all issues presented at 
trial.  This Motion is based on the facts that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring 
the Defendants’ admission in their answer that Plaintiffs were members of DTC Group, LLC, 
which prevented Plaintiffs from having a fair trial; (2) there was insufficient evidence to justify 
Electronically Filed
11/23/2016 3:29:58 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk
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MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL - 2 
the verdict as the great weight of evidence supported Defendants’ admission that Plaintiffs were 
members of DTC Group, LLC; (3) there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict that 
Defendant Crossett’s compensation was part of the “Net Income” line item in the DTC Group, 
LLC profit and loss statement presented at trial; and (4) the trial court committed a clear error in 
law in refusing to acknowledge or follow the statutory guidelines that outline the how an LLC is 
to be governed should there be gaps in an operating agreement or should a written agreement 
never be executed  This request is further supported by the accompanying Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for a New Trial, Plaintiff Johnson’s Affidavit in Support of Motion for a New 
Trial, and James Jacobson’s Affidavit in Support of Motion for a New Trial. 
 
 DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016 
 
        JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
 
 
        By: /s/ James F. Jacobson 
             James F. Jacobson 
             Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of November, 2016, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document(s) was served upon: 
 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
 
 
[   ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[   ] Hand-Delivered 
[X]        iCourt/email 
[   ] Facsimile  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016. 
 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
 
 
 
By: /s/ James F. Jacobson  
     James F. Jacobson 
 Attorneys for Plaintiffs                          
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James F. Jacobson [ISB No. 7011]  
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID 83714 
Telephone: (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile: (208) 477-5210  
Email:  james@jjlawidaho.com 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
                  
 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
 
                                       Plaintiffs, 
 
vs.  
 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BO W. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married 
couple, 
 
                         Defendants.  
 
 CASE NO. CV OC 1513887 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
 
COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiffs, DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual in the above matter, by and through their counsel of record, 
Jacobson & Jacobson, PLLC, and hereby submit this Memorandum in Support of Motion for a 
New Trial: 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are multiple grounds on which Plaintiffs request a new trial.  First, the trial court 
committed an error in law by (1) refusing to acknowledge that Defendants admitted that 
Electronically Filed
11/23/2016 3:29:58 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk
000122
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 2 
Plaintiffs were members of DTC Group, LLC (hereafter “DTC”) in their pleadings; and (2) 
refusing to apply the standards clearly set out in the Idaho Code for situations in which either 
there are gaps in the operating agreement or the operating agreement is oral and not written. 
Second, there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict that (1) Plaintiffs were not members 
of DTC and (2) no damages were owed based on the rationale that Defendant Crossett had paid 
Plaintiffs what they were owed before DTC’s doors were shut. And third, the trial court 
committed an abuse of discretion by refusing to acknowledge that Defendants had admitted in 
their pleadings that both Plaintiffs were members of DTC.  This prevented Plaintiffs from having 
a fair trial, as Defendants had already admitted to their own liability, yet the trial court declared 
that Defendant Crossett was not liable because Plaintiffs were not members of DTC.  A new trial 
is warranted under any one of these grounds.  See I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(1) (stating that the court 
can grant a new trial for any of the reasons listed above).  Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully 
request this court grant this motion and issue a new trial in this matter. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. A new trial should be granted on the grounds that the trial court committed errors 
in law by ignoring the admission by Defendants in the pleadings. 
 
In Idaho, a new trial may be granted on the grounds that the trial court committed “error in 
law, occurring at the trial.”  I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(1)(H).  When a motion is based on these 
grounds, the moving party “must set forth with particularity the factual grounds for the motion.”  
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(2).  To determine whether a new trial is warranted, the court must apply a 
two-prong test.  Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 648, 200 P.3d 1191, 1197 (2008).  First, “the 
court must find that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of 
justice would be served by vacating the verdict.”  Id.  And second, “the court must conclude that 
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a retrial would produce a different result.”  Id.  In determining the second prong, the court must 
determine that it is more probable than not that a retrial would produce a different result.  
Blizzard v. Lundeby, 156 Idaho 204, 208, 322 P.3d 286, 290 (2014) (“The second prong ‘requires 
more than a mere possibility; there must be a probability that a different result would be obtained 
in a new trial.’”).  Where the court finds that such prejudicial errors of law have occurred, “[t]he 
trial court has a duty to grant a new trial.”  Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378, 380, 3 P.3d 56, 58 
(2000). 
It is clear that the court committed prejudicial error by ignoring the admissions by 
Defendants in their pleadings, and ruling that Plaintiffs were not members of DTC.  The law is 
clear when it comes to admissions in pleadings.  “Admissions made in a pleading are 
denominated solemn admissions and are not required to be supported by evidence on the part of 
the adverse party.  Such admissions are taken as true against the party making them, without 
further proof or controversy.”  Knowles v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 16 Idaho 217, 229, 101 
P. 81, 85-86 (1908), reversed on other grounds, Knowles v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 16 
Idaho 235, 101 P. 81 (1909) (emphasis added).   
In the pleadings, Defendants admitted that “Defendant [Crossett] filed, on behalf of the 
business that Plaintiffs and Defendant Crossett had formed, articles of organization for [DTC].”  
First Amended Complaint, ¶ 14 (emphasis added); Answer to First Amended Complaint, ¶ 9.  
This clearly is an admission that Defendant Crossett filed with the intent that “Plaintiffs and 
Defendant Crossett” were the initial members of the limited liability company that they had 
formed together.  Further, Defendants admitted that Defendant Crossett listed himself as “a 
member” and not the member.  First Amended Complaint, ¶ 14 (emphasis added); Answer to 
First Amended Complaint, ¶ 9.  This admission should have negated the possibility of the court 
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ruling that Defendant Crossett formed a single member LLC.  Yet the court, in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, ruled that Defendant Crossett initially formed DTC as a single-
member LLC.  Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of Judgment, p. 
19.  The trial court blatantly refused to acknowledge the admissions of the Defendants in their 
pleadings.  Such an act by the court is clearly in opposition to the long-held standard that 
admissions in pleadings are “taken as true.”  Knowles, 16 Idaho at 229, 101 P. at 85.   
The evidence shows that the trial court committed an error of law in this issue, which would 
require a retrial to serve the ends of justice.  Also, the evidence also shows that this error clearly 
prejudiced the Plaintiffs through the court’s adverse ruling on this issue at trial, and that it is 
more probable than not that the outcome of this issue would change upon retrial.  As such, it is 
the duty of the court to grant a new trial.  See Schaefer, 134 Idaho at 380, 3 P.3d at 58. 
B. A new trial should be granted on the grounds that the court committed errors in law 
by ignoring the Idaho Code’s treatment of limited liability companies. 
 
The court committed error in law by refusing to apply the standards that are clearly outlined 
in the Idaho Code for situations in which there are gaps in the operating agreement, or where 
there is no written operating agreement.  Instead, the trial court applied its own version of what is 
to happen in such situations.  The trial court made this clear when it stated that “[t]he law on 
limited liability companies is seriously underdeveloped,” and that it is “not clear in the law what 
is to happen when things go wrong and the formation of the company is imperfectly carried out.”  
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of Judgment, p. 15.1 
                                                
1 In fact, the court did not cite to any case law, and only cited one statute, in support of its 
conclusions of law.  See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of 
Judgment, pp. 14-21.  Where a significant number of relevant statutes were placed in front of the 
court in Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum and argued at the closing of the trial, it is difficult to 
understand why the trial court referenced only a single citation in a seven-page brief entitled 
“Analysis and Conclusions of Law.” 
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The trial court chose to ignore the fact that an oral operating agreement can serve as a fully 
functioning operating agreement throughout the life of an LLC.  See I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(9) 
(stating that an operating agreement can be “oral, implied, in a record, or in any combination 
thereof.”).  The court wonders, “what happens when the formation [of an LLC] is incomplete?”  
The Idaho legislature has clearly spelled out what is to happen in such situations.  In the 
comments to Idaho Code Section 30-25-102(a)(9), the legislature stated: 
[A]s soon as a limited liability company has any members, the limited liability 
company perforce has an operating agreement.  For example, suppose: (i) two 
persons orally and informally agree to join their activities in some way through 
the mechanism of an LLC; (ii) they form the LLC or cause it to be formed; and 
(iii) without further ado or agreement, they become the LLC’s initial members.  
An operating agreement exists. 
  
I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(9), cmt. (Emphasis added).  It is clear that the terms agreed to in any oral 
operating agreement are to be treated as though it were a written agreement.  Furthermore, the 
Idaho Code has outlined how an LLC is to be governed in situations where there are gaps in the 
terms of the operating agreement.  See I.C. §§ 30-25-101 through 111 (governing such general 
provisions of the LLC including the operating agreement and its scope and effect on the LLC, its 
member, and those with whom it does business); I.C. §§ 30-25-201 through 205 (governing the 
formation of an LLC); I.C. §§ 30-25-301 through 304 (governing the relations of members and 
managers to persons dealing with the LLC); I.C. §§ 30-25-401 through 410 (governing the 
relations of members to each other and the LLC); I.C. §§ 30-25-501 through 504 (governing the 
ability of members to transfer interests and the rights and interests of transferees and creditors); 
I.C. §§ 30-25-601 through 603 (governing the process of dissociation of a member); I.C. §§30-
25-701 through 708 (governing the process of dissolution and winding up of an LLC); I.C. §§ 
30-25-801 through 806 (governing the ability of members to initiate legal action against the 
LLC).  Some of these statutes are default rules that can be changed by the operating agreement, 
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should the members so wish.  See I.C. § 30-25-105(b) (“To the extent the operating agreement 
does not provide for a matter described in subsection (a) of this section, this chapter governs the 
matter.”).  And some cannot be changed by the operating agreement.  See I.C. § 30-25-105(c).  
Everything from the birth of an LLC through to its death, and everything in between, is governed 
by either the operating agreement or the Idaho Code, or both.  Yet the trial court could not decide 
whether partnership law or corporate law should govern such situations.  See Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of Judgment, p. 15-16 (“In partnership law and 
corporate law, these areas are covered by statutory provisions. . . . However, in the case of an 
LLC, the only guidance in the statutes is that these areas are to be handled as agreed in the 
operating agreement.”).   
In further error, the trial court stated that, “[o]nce the written operating agreement was vetted 
by counsel and approved by the parties, the oral agreements between [the parties] were 
insufficient to stand as an oral operating agreement, at least with respect to the admission of 
Cousins and Johnson as members.”  Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for 
Entry of Judgment, p. 18.  The court further stated: 
[t]here might have been some weight to plaintiff’s argument if the [written] 
operating agreement had never been prepared and agreed upon. . . . But when the 
agreement that is contemplated by the parties and required by law is fully 
prepared, vetted by counsel, approved by both parties, and presented for 
signature, and then one party unilaterally declines to sign, . . . that is a clear 
indication that there is not a meeting of the minds. 
 
Id. at p. 19-20.  These statements taken together seem to suggest that the trial court believes that 
an oral operating agreement, recognized as valid by both statute and case law (See I.C. § 30-25-
102(a)(9); I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(9), cmt.; Estate of E.A. Collins v. Geist, 143 Idaho 821, 153 P.3d 
1167 (2007)), becomes null and void only upon the drafting of a written operating agreement tha 
remains unsigned by all parties.  Such a view is clearly erroneous. 
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  The written operating agreement can only be seen as a proposed amendment of the original 
oral operating agreement as it substantially expanded the terms of its governance over DTC. 
However, this amendment was never signed by any of the members of DTC, including 
Defendant Crossett.  Therefore, the amendment was never executed, and has no effect over the 
original operating agreement.  Plaintiffs are unaware of any statute or case law that allows an 
unexecuted amendment of an operating agreement to automatically take the place of a valid 
operating agreement by its mere, unsigned existence alone.  As such, the evidence on this issue 
and the interests of justice clearly weigh in favor granting a new trial.  Also, Plaintiffs were again 
clearly prejudiced by this error in law, and it is very probable that a retrial will result in a 
different verdict.  As such, it is the duty of the court to grant a new trial.  See Schaefer, 134 Idaho 
at 380, 3 P.3d at 58. 
C. A new trial should be granted on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the trial court’s verdict on the issues of both liability and damages. 
 
Under Idaho law, the court may grant a new trial if there was insufficient evidence to justify 
the verdict of the trial court.  I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(1)(G).  When a motion is based on these 
grounds, the moving party “must set forth with particularity the factual grounds for the motion.”  
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(2).  “In order to grant a new trial on the ground of insufficiency . . . the trial 
court must determine both (1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, and (2) a 
new trial would produce a different result.”  Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 
193 (1990).   
On the issue of liability, the court ruled that Defendant Crossett was not liable to the 
Plaintiffs since the Plaintiffs were never members of DTC.  See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Directions for Entry of Judgment, p. 18.  The clear weight of the evidence, however, 
opposes this verdict.  The particular facts in support of this are discussed at length in the previous 
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two sections of this memo, along with the Affidavit of David Johnson in Support of the Motion 
to Grant a New Trial.  The weight of the evidence supports the position that Plaintiffs were, and 
always have been, members of DTC.  Thus, considering this fact, a new trial will produce a 
different result on the issue of liability. 
On the issue of damages, the court ruled that both Plaintiffs were paid everything that was 
owed to them.  See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of Judgment, 
p. 18.  However, this is not the case if Plaintiffs were members of DTC from its inception.  In 
particular, Exhibit H from the trial is a profit and loss statement from DTC which shows a net 
income for the years 2013 and 2014.  See Exhibit H.  At trial, Defendant Crossett testified that 
his salary as manager of DTC came from that net income.  Affidavit of James Jacobson, ¶ 2.  
However, Defendant Crossett testified in his deposition that his salary was part of the payroll line 
item in the profit and loss statement.  Affidavit of James Jacobson, ¶ 3.  This position was 
supported by the testimony of Plaintiff Cousins at trial, where she stated that the salary of all 
DTC employees, including Defendant Crossett’s salary, were reflected in the payroll line item of 
the profit and loss statement.  Affidavit of James Jacobson, ¶ 4.  Therefore, the clear weight of 
the evidence shows that, as members, Plaintiffs were not paid everything that was owed to them 
as they were owed their portion of the net income from DTC.  Considering this evidence, it is 
also clear that the result of the damages issue would be different if the issue were tried again.  
Therefore, this court should grant a new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence 
to justify the verdict of the court on both liability and damages. 
D. A new trial should be granted on the grounds that the trial court abused its 
discretion which prevented Plaintiffs from having a fair trial. 
 
Under Idaho law, a court may grant a new trial should there be “any order of the court or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.”  I.R.C.P. Rule 
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59(a)(1)(B).  A motion based on these grounds “must be accompanied by an affidavit stating in 
detail the facts relied upon in support of the motion.”  I.R.C.P. Rule 59 (a)(2).   
An affidavit by Plaintiff Johnson has been filed, which details the facts relied upon by the 
Plaintiffs in support of the Motion to Grant a New Trial (hereafter “Motion”).  Briefly, the facts 
outline that the trial court was made aware that Defendants had admitted to the fact that Plaintiffs 
were members of DTC in their pleadings.  Affidavit of David Johnson, ¶ 3.  The court was also 
made aware of all the facts that supported this admission.  Affidavit of David Johnson, ¶ 4.  Yet 
the trial court unilaterally chose to ignore this admission, and ruled that neither Plaintiff was ever 
a member of DTC.  See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of 
Judgment, p. 18.  Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel specifically pointed out to the trial court the fact 
that Defendants had made this admission, both during the course of the trial and at closing 
argument. The fact that the trial court clearly ignored the pleadings prejudiced the Plaintiffs, and 
prevented them from having a fair trial.  As such, the court should grant a new trial on the 
grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring the pleadings of the parties. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
This memorandum has outlined four grounds on which the court should grant Plaintiffs a 
new trial in this matter.  The trial court committed an error in law by ignoring the admission of 
Defendants in their pleading that Plaintiffs were members of DTC from its founding.  The trial 
court committed error in law by ignoring the Idaho Code which clearly outlines the governance 
of a limited liability company when there are gaps in an operating agreement or when there is an 
oral operating agreement.  There was insufficient evidence for the trial court’s verdicts on the 
issues of liability and damages.  Under Idaho law, a new trial can be granted on any one of these 
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grounds.  See I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(1) (stating that the court can grant a new trial for any of the 
reasons listed in this memorandum).  The clear weight of the evidence in these matters suggests 
that a new trial is needed in the interest of serving justice.  The evidence also suggests that a 
different result is more probable than not.  Considering all of these facts and evidence, this court 
should grant the Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New Trial, and Plaintiffs respectfully request that the 
Court do so. 
 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016 
       JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
By: /s/ James F. Jacobson 
           James F. Jacobson 
           Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of November, 2016, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document(s) was served upon: 
 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
 
 
[   ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[   ] Hand-Delivered 
[X]        iCourt/email 
[   ] Facsimile  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016. 
 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
 
 
 
By:  /s/ James F. Jacobson 
      James F. Jacobson, of the firm 
          Attorneys for Plaintiffs                          
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone:  208.287.3216 
Facsimile:  208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLAINCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BO W. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married couple, 
Defendants. 
  
Case No.  CV OC 1513887 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
 
 As the Court is aware, following the trial of this case, Judge McKee entered Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of Judgment (“Findings”).  In those Findings, 
Judge McKee held that “[t]he action is at its foundation a claim for money due from David 
Crossett.  He individually, is entitled to his attorney fees under I.C. ¶ 12-120.”  Findings, p. 21. 
Electronically Filed
12/1/2016 3:28:14 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katie Holden, Deputy Clerk
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 This case, in sum, was based on Plaintiffs’ claim that a business existed, that Plaintiffs 
were members of that business and that Mr. Crossett took money from that business that he 
should have distributed to them.   
 In objection to the motion for attorney fees, Plaintiffs take the position that because their 
claims were based on statutes, they fall outside the purview of I.C. § 12-120(3) and no fees 
should be awarded.1  In this case, Plaintiffs did not attempt to enforce statutory penalties, they 
attempted to “undo” a series of commercial transactions; that is the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims.  
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the litigation “depends” on the contractual relationship between the 
parties as member of DTC Group, LLC.  See Objection, page 3. 
Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint seek a Declaratory Judgment 
Most importantly, Count I seeks a declaration that Plaintiffs were members of Drug Testing 
Compliance Group, LLC  (“DTC Group) and Count XI (“tortious interference with business 
expectancy”).  None of these Counts are based on statute. 
Judge McKee’s decision “declares” that Plaintiffs were not members, therefore Plaintiffs 
had no business expectancy in DTC Group.  That is the crux, and the end, of the case. 
Put another way, the first “hurdle” Plaintiffs had to get past in this litigation was whether 
or not they were members of DTC Group, LLC; did the events or “transactions” that transpired 
between the parties give Plaintiffs membership status.  This was not a statutory claim but 
required a factual determination by the Court.  It was concluded that Plaintiffs were not members 
DTC Group.  The remaining claims of Plaintiffs then became moot.  Plaintiffs therefore have no 
recovery and Mr. Crossett is the prevailing party.  
                                                
1 Notwithstanding the position taken in their objection that there is no basis to award attorney 
fees and costs, tellingly, in their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs ask that they be awarded 
their attorney fees and costs. 
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  Because Plaintiff did not prevail on their (non-statutory) claim that they were in fact 
members of DTC Group, Mr. Crossett is the prevailing party and should be awarded his attorney 
fees and costs. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 2016 
 
     POINTS LAW, PLLC 
 
 
 
     By: /s/ Michelle R. Points  
Michelle R. Points 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance 
Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES by filing said pleading using iCourts! wherein the following were served 
electronically: 
 
James F. Jacobson 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
      /s/ Michelle R. Points 
      Michelle R. Points 
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katie Holden, Deputy Clerk
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLAINCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BOW. and 
KRYST AL SCHMELLING, a married couple, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1513887 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
Plaintiffs assert four arguments as to why they believe the Court should order a new trial. 
None of the arguments have merit and are arguably frivolous. 
1. Defendants' "Admission" 
Plaintiffs argue that a new trial should be granted on the grounds that the trial court 
committed error by ignoring certain "admissions" in a pleading made by Defendants. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs in their First Amended Complaint alleged "Defendant [Crossett] filed, on 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 1 
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behalf of the business that Plaintiffs and Defendant Crossett had formed, articles of organization 
for an Idaho limited liability company, listing himself as a Member or Manager and as the 
registered agent. The limited liability company was named "Drug Testing Compliance Group, 
LLC." 
Defendant Crossett has never denied this allegation. There is a difference in a group of 
people forming a company, and the individuals that formed the company actually becoming 
members of the company. That is, forming a company and becoming a member of a company 
are two separate things, and as Plaintiffs have been made repeatedly aware, that has been how 
Mr. Crossett has consistently explained this "admission." 
Evidence was presented throughout trial that Plaintiffs didn't want to become members of 
DTC Group or sign the written operating agreement1 given the turmoil that had erupted since it 
opened its doors for business. The Court got it exactly right when it held that "the oral 
agreement with regard to Cousins and Johnson was that they would become members upon 
signing of the operating agreement." Findings, p. 11. 
Next, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants "admitted" in their Answer the allegation that 
Defendant Crossett listed himself a member and not the member, and that this admission should 
have negated a finding by the Court that DTC Group was a single member LLC - apparently 
taking the position that if he really thought he was the only member then he should have denied 
the allegation? Plaintiffs' argument is frivolous. Mr. Crossett admitted he listed himself as a 
member. See attached Secretary of State printout - he did list himself as a member - was he to 
deny Plaintiffs' allegation? Of course not. 
1 The operating agreement, which was drafted by Mr. Jacobsen, had been completed and was 
ready to sign. 
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2. The Code 
Plaintiffs next argue that they should be given a new trial because the Court ignored 
Idaho Code which provides that an oral operating agreement can serve as a fully functioning 
operating agreement. This is a non issue. Plaintiffs did not want to become members of DTC 
Group and agreed that they would only become members of DTC Group upon signing the 
operating agreement that had been prepared by Mr. Jacobsen-which is why they refused to sign 
it! There was substantial testimony on this issue. Notwithstanding some misconstrued dicta 
from Judge McKee's findings of fact, the bottom line is the code doesn't come into play at all 
because Plaintiffs were not members of DTC Group. To further support this point, Mr. Johnson 
testified throughout his deposition and at trial that the written operating agreement that had been 
drafted by Mr. Jacobsen controlled the status of the parties, and the operating agreement 
(Defendants' Exhibit A) clearly provides that no person will be admitted to the Company as a 
member unless they sign the signature page of the operating agreement. See Section 3.4, p. 9. 
Signing was a condition precedent to membership. 
3. Liability and Damages 
Plaintiffs dispute the Court's finding that they were not members of DTC Group. 
Plaintiffs argue that they were members, thus, the Court should have reached a "different result" 
on these issues. 
As set forth above, the Court properly held that Plaintiffs were not members of DTC 
Group, thus there is no reason to re-visit the issues of liability and damages. 
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4. Fair Trial 
The argument presented by Plaintiffs in this section simply restates their earlier 
arguments that the Court ignored certain admissions, which admissions were addressed in 
section one of this brief. 
5. Conclusion 
Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial is entirely frivolous. The motion should be denied and 
Mr. Crossett should be awarded his attorney fees and costs for having to respond to it. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 2016 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
By: /s/ Michelle R. Points 
Michelle R. Points 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance 
Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES by filing said pleading using iCourts! wherein the following were served 
electronically: 
James F. Jacobson 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
/s/ Michelle R. Points 
Michelle R. Points 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287 .3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BOW. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married couple, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1513887 
DECLARATION OF COUNSEL 
SETTING FORTH ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
Michelle R. Points declares and affirms as follows pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406: 
This declaration is submitted as a supplement to the declaration filed on or about 
November 8, 2016, as my clients have incurred additional attorney fees given Plaintiffs objection 
to my clients' motion for attorney fees and costs, and motion for a new trial. 
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My previous declaration set for the following: 
SUMMARY OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED for Points Law, PLLC: 
Attorney fees: 
Mandatory costs (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) 
Total 
$18,216.00 
$ 991.07 
$19,207.07 
Since the time of that filing I have incurred 2.9 hours addressing the referenced motions filed by 
Plaintiffs, thus my client has incurred $667.00 in addition fees, bringing the total amount sought 
to: $19,874.07. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 2016 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
By: Isl Michelle R. Points 
Michelle R. Points 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance 
Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF COUNSEL SETTING FORTH 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS by filing said pleading using iCourts! wherein the following 
were served electronically: 
James F. Jacobson 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
Isl Michelle R. Points 
Michelle R. Points 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF COUNSEL SETTING FORTH ATTORNEY 2 
FEES AND COSTS 
Ruling on Objection to Defendant’s Application for Attorney Fees  1 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
 
 
DAVID JOHNSON and TESSA 
COUSINS, individually, 
 
               Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, et al. 
 
               Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. CV OC 1513887 
 
 
 
RULING ON OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
 
 
 The defendant David Crossett, individually, clearly prevailed in this matter and 
was awarded his costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and his attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Plaintiffs concede the defendant entitlement to costs as 
the prevailing party under the civil rules as a matter of right, but object to any attorney 
fees. Their contention is that the action in question here was not founded upon “a 
commercial transaction” as is required for any award of attorney fees, but rather was an 
action to enforce a statutory penalty or right – which by case law is not considered a 
commercial transaction. 
 Under I.C. § 12-120(3), a “commercial transaction” is defined as “all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes.” By case law, the Idaho court 
limited application of this statute where other statutes exist that provide for or prevent 
award of attorney fees. Where such other statutes exist, the Supreme Court has held that 
attorney fees are only available under the germane statutes; there is to be no duplication. 
Signed: 12/16/2016 09:36 AM
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C erk 
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Where, however, the other statutes contain no separate provision for attorney fees, and 
provided that the action otherwise appears to be founded upon transactions that are not 
for “personal or household purposes,” the general attorney fee statute of I.C. § 12-120(3) 
is available. 
 Plaintiffs contend that their cause of action against the defendant David Crossett 
was founded upon the defendant’s breach of duty under one or more of I.C. §§ 30-25-
404(d), 30-25-407(a), 30-25-409(c), or 30-25-602. Their theory of recovery, according to 
the plaintiffs, was to enforce a statutory penalty or right as contained in one or more of 
these statutes, which precluded an award under I.C. § 12-120(3). The rationale is not 
supportable; it is not the existence of a defined right or provision in another statute that is 
controlling here, it is whether the other statute includes its own provision for attorney 
fees that preempts application of I.C. § 12-120(3). 
 Here, the limited liability company that might have been the subject matter of the 
action no longer exists; by the time of trial, both the defendant Drug Testing Compliance 
Group, LLC, or DTC, and the defendant Vurv LLC had been liquidated and dissolved. 
The action was continued only as an individual action for damages by the plaintiffs 
against Crossett for damages upon a breach.  
 This was not an attempted derivative action for the benefit of the company under 
I.C. § 30-25-802, but rather by individuals claiming to be members against another 
member for damages on account of the individual plaintiffs’ own interests. The action is 
permitted by I.C. § 30-25-801(a), so long as no part of what is claimed inures to the 
benefit of the company generally, in which case it would be permitted only as a 
derivative action under I.C. § 30-22-802. The derivative action has its own statutory 
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provision for attorney fees under the statute, but nothing is said about attorney fees in the 
exception statute permitting an action by members against members. With the exception 
of the provision for attorney fees to a sustaining member in a derivative action, there is 
no provision in the code sections pertaining to limited liability companies on the subject 
of penalty for enforcement or attorney fees. 
 If a breach had been found, and the individuals found to be entitled to damages as 
member of the limited liability company, the calculation of damages might have been 
under one or more of the limited liability statutes cited, but one first had to find an 
ordinary breach of contract to reach the issue of any entitlement under the statutes.
 Idaho Code § 30-25-404(d) provides that if a member is entitled to a distribution 
from the company, the member “is entitled to all the remedies available to a creditor of 
the limited liability company.” This would include attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
 Idaho Code § 30-25-407(a) merely provides that a limited liability company is 
member managed unless the operating agreement provides otherwise. Subpart (b) of the 
statute provides, in general, that in a member managed company, a majority vote of the 
members is required for any action. 
 Idaho Code § 30-25-409(a) provides that a member owes a duty of loyalty, as 
defined, to other members and to the company. Included in subpart (d) is the provision 
that duties shall be discharged consistent with the implied contractual provisions of good 
faith and fair dealing, which is a common law provision incorporated into every contract. 
Under subpart (c), in winding up a company, the duty of loyalty or standard of conduct is 
generally defined as refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, or 
willful misconduct or knowing violations of the law, which are all common law 
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standards. Under subpart (e), a member does not violate this section merely because the 
member’s conduct furthers his own interests. This provision of the code defines an 
exception to the relationship of members; it does not provide for any penalty upon breach 
or other means of enforcement. There is nothing in this statutory structure that would 
preempt I.C. § 12-120(3) in an action among individuals. 
 Idaho Code § 30-25-602 provides for the dissociation of a member, including 
expelling the member, and the effects thereof. However, the facts as found in this case 
were that the plaintiffs never became members of the company.  
 When Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies, an award of attorney fees is mandatory. 
Action Collection Servs., Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 290, 192 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Ct. 
App. 2008). In order to determine whether Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies to a given 
case, “[t]he critical test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of 
the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute the 
basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.” Ervin Const. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 
Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993). In De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Idaho Code Section 12–120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing 
party in a civil action to recover on “any commercial transaction.” 
Commercial transactions are all transactions except for personal or 
household purposes. Whether there is a commercial transaction is a 
question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Where a party 
alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by 
section 12–120(3) . . . that claim triggers the application of [I.C. § 12–
120(3) ] and a prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability 
under a contract was established. This same principle applies where the 
action is one to recover in a commercial transaction, regardless of the 
proof that the commercial transaction alleged did, in fact, occur. Idaho 
courts will consider whether the parties alleged the application of I.C. § 
12–120.  
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De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 157 Idaho 557, 338 P.3d 536, 546 (2014) (citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
 The gravamen of the action in this case was a claim among individuals for 
damages in failing to divide the profits of the enterprise as was allegedly agreed. 
However, the facts as found were that there were no profits to divide. A commercial 
transaction was integral to the plaintiffs’ claims and was the basis upon which they 
sought recovery. 
 The cases cited by the plaintiff are distinguishable from the facts as found in this 
case. In Kelly v Silkwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624 (1995), the suit was by a claimed 
partner against the partnership as an entity for an accounting in c connection with the 
winding up of partnership affairs. It was brought under the provisions of the Uniform 
Partnership Act and was not an action between individuals. In Gumprect v Doyle, 128 
Idaho 242 (1995), the gravamen of the action was by a professional who had withdrawn 
from the professional corporation in a dispute over the value of shares that were 
repurchased by the corporation; it was brought under the corporation code provisions 
pertaining to rights of minority shareholders, it was not an action among individuals. 
Shay v Cesler, 132 Idaho 585 (1999), was an action for treble damages on unpaid wages 
which included a specific statute on attorney fees. LW Supply Corp v Chartrand Family 
Trust, 136 Idaho 738 (2002) was a statutory lien foreclosure with a specific statute 
covering attorney fees. 
 “The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial 
court.” Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749 
(1996).  “When awarding attorney's fees, a district court must consider the applicable 
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factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court 
deems appropriate.” Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749–50, 185 P.3d 258, 261–
62 (2008) (citation omitted). “Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the district court to make 
specific findings in the record, only to consider the stated factors in determining the 
amount of the fees. When considering the factors, courts need not demonstrate how they 
employed any of those factors in reaching an award amount.” Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 
893, 902, 104 P.3d 367, 376 (2004). 
The attorney fees as claimed are supported by the detailed recitation of time plus a 
reasonable allowance for the additional work. I have considered all of the elements of 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and find the following to be germane to my decision here: (A) the time 
and effort required, (B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, (C) the skill 
required, (D) prevailing charges for like work, (G) the amount involved and the result 
obtained. Other factors in the rule are not applicable or significant to this case. I find and 
conclude that the attorney fee claim of $18,883.00 for fees is reasonable and appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
 Attorney fees are awarded in the amount of $18,883.00. As noted at the hearing, 
there is no dispute as to the costs, of which all are allowed as a matter of right. Costs are 
awarded in the amount of $991.07. 
 It is so ordered. 
 Dated this __ day of December, 2016. 
       
          
   
      Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
 
 I hereby certify that on _________________, I served a true and correct copy of 
the within instrument to: 
 
James Frederick Jacobson 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC  
7655 W. Riverside Drive  
Boise, ID 83714  
james@jjlawidaho.com 
 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main Street, Ste. 222  
Boise, ID 83702  
mpoints@pointslaw.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
     Clerk of the District Court 
 
 
              
    By:_______________________________ 
     Deputy Court Clerk 
    
Signed: 12/16/2016 09:37 AM
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JUDGMENT 1 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone:  208.287.3216 
Facsimile:  208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BO W. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married couple, 
Defendants. 
  
Case No.  CV OC 1513887 
JUDGMENT 
 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
 
1. Plaintiffs David Johnson and Tessa Cousins take nothing by their complaint, as 
amended,  and that complaint is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety against 
Defendants David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC. 
2. Defendant David Crossett is awarded judgment in the amount of $19,207.07 against 
Plaintiffs David Johnson and Tessa Cousins, jointly and severally. 
Signed: 12/21/2016 10:48 AM
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F,omt ll Jlld fcial Dist rfct, Ad a County 
CH RISl O PH ER D. RI CH, Cle rlk. 
JUDGMENT 2 
 
DATED this ______ day of December, 2016 
 
 
 
     By:      
The Honorable D. Duff McKee 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ____ day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT by filing said pleading using iCourts! wherein the 
following were served electronically: 
 
James F. Jacobson 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
james@jjlawidaho.com 
 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
mpoints@pointslaw.com 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
      /s/  
      CLERK OF THE COURT 
Signed: 12/20/2016 04:00 PM
for
Signed: 12/21/2016 10:49 AM
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James F. Jacobson [ISB No. 7011] 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
7655 W. Riverside Drive 
Boise, ID 83714 
Telephone: (208) 884-1995 
Facsimile: (208) 477-5210 
Email: james@jjlawidaho.com 
Attorneys for Appellants 
; 
NO FILEO~:Js 
A.M.----PM...;;;..---
JAN 2 7 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON; an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BOW. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married 
_couple, 
Res ondents. 
CASE NO. CV OC 1513887 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: DAVID CROSSETT, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY OF RECORD, POINTS 
LAW, PLLC, AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: 
' That the above-named Appellants, David Johnson and Tessa Cousins (hereinafter 
"Plaintiffs"), appeal against the above-named Respondent, David Crossett (hereinafter 
"Defendant"), to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment that was issued on December 21, 
2016, together with all other interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior thereto in this 
action, Honorable D. Duff McKee presiding. That Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -1 ORIGINAL 
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Supreme Court, with the final appealable judgment being entered by the district court in this 
action on December 21, ·2016, thereby making the above referenced Order and Judgment 
appealable pursuant to I.A.R. 11 ( a )(1). A copy of the final judgment being appealed is attached 
to this notice. 
Preliminarily, the issues to be determined on appeal are as follows: 
1. whether the trial court committed a prejudicial error of law by ignoring Defendants' 
admission in their First Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs were members of DTC 
Group, LLC; 
2. whether the trial court committed a prejudicial error of law by failing to appropriately 
apply various provisions ofldaho's statute governing limited liability companies; 
3,- whether there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's verdict on the 
issues of both liability and damages; 
4. whether the trial court committed error by ignoring Defendants' admission in their 
First Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs were members of DTC Group, LLC; and 
5. whether the trial court erred in granting attorney's fees to Defendants under Idaho 
Code Section 12-120(3). 
This list of issues to be determined on appeal shall not prevent Appellant from asserting other 
issues on appeal. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript in electronic format: (1) the testimony of David Johnson from October 17-
18, 2016 and (2) the testimony of David Crossett from October 17-18, 2016. 
In addition to the standard record provided for in I.A.R. 28, Appellant hereby requests 
that the following documents be included in the clerk's record on appeal: 
• Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. 
• Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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• Affidavit of James F. Jacobson in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. 
• Affidavit of David Johnson in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. 
• Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. 
• Declaration of Counsel Setting Forth Attorney Fees and Costs. 
• Supplemental Declaration of Counsel Setting Forth Attorney Fees and Costs. 
• Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees. 
• Reply to Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees. 
• Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Memo. 
• Defendant's Pre-Trial Memo. 
The appellant requests that all exhibits admitted into evidence at the trial of this 
matter be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
I certify: (a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: Christy 
Olesek, 4883 N. Lake Park PL, Garden City, ID 83714; (b) that the clerk of the district court has 
. ' 
been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript; ( c) that the estimated fee 
for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid; (d) that the appellate filing fee has 
been paid; and ( e) that service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 .. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 2017. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
es F. Jacobso , Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of January, 2016, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document(s) was served upon: 
Michelle R. Points [X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid POINTS LAW, PLLC [ ] Hand-Delivered 910 W. Main, Ste. 222 [X] iCourt/email Boise, ID 83702 [ ] Facsimile Facsimile: (208) 336-2088 
Clerk of the Court [X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Ada County [ ] Hand-Delivered [X] iCourt/email 200 W. Front St. [ ] Facsimile Boise, ID 83701 
Court Reporter [X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid [ ] Hand-Delivered Christy Olesek [X] iCourt/email 4883 N. Lake Park Pl. [ L Facsimile Garden City, ID 83714 
DATED this 27th day of January, 2017. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
~~ 
By: Isl runes F. Jacobson 
James F. Jacobson, of the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
FILED By: ~NznAA- t Deputy crerrk 
Fourth Judccfai District, Ada County 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C!eirk 
Attorney for David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, SCOTT 
H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING 
COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, BOW. and 
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married couple, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV OC 1513887 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiffs David Johnson and Tessa Cousins take nothing by their complaint, as 
amended, and that complaint is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety against 
Defendants David Crossett, Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC and Vurv, LLC. 
2. Defendant David Crossett is awarded judgment in the amount of$19,207.07 against 
Plaintiffs David Johnson and Tessa Cousins, jointly and severally. 
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DATED this ___ day of December, 2016 
Signed: 12/20/2016 04:00 PM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Signed: 12/21/2016 10:49 AM 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT by filing said pleading using iCourts! wherein the 
following were served electronically: 
James F. Jacobson 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
james@jjlawidaho.com 
Michelle R. Points 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Isl J.h-J>~a~ 1-\,-,-J~ 
CLERKOF THE COUR{/ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
SCOTT H. LEE, an individual, DRUG 
TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, VURV, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
BOW. and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a 
married couple, 
Defendants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44791 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal · 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 2nd day of March, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
. .......... , ,,, .. . 
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EXHIBIT LIST 
Judge D. Duff McKee/ Stephanie Hardy 
Judge Clerk 
DATE: October 17, 2016 DISPOSITION: Court Trial 
CASE NO. CVOC15.13887 
I David Johnson · James Jacobson 
I Tessa Cousins 
Plaintiff Attorney(s) 
vs. 
David Crossett Michelle Points 
Drug Testing Compliance "OTC" 
Defendant Attorney( s) 
BY NO. DESCRIPTION STATUS 
Plaintiff 1 OTC Checks Admitted 10/18/16 
Plaintiff 2 Operating Agreement for OTC Admitted 10/18/16 
Plaintiff 3 Profit and Loss from 1 /1 /13-12/31 /15 Admitted 10/18/16 
Plaintiff 4 Check from OTC to Tessa Cousins Admitted 10/18/16 
Plaintiff 5 Emails between David Johnson and James Jacobson Admitted 10/18/16 
Plaintiff 6 Text messages communication between Johnson/Crossett Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense A OperatinQ Agreement of OTC Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense B Statement of David M. Johnson dated 8/25/13 Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense C Statement of David M. Johnson dated 6/10/14 Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense D Checks from OTC Group, LLC to David Johnson Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense E Letter to Tessa Cousins to David dated 10/2/14 Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense F Journal entries by Jill Johnson dated 7 /8/13 Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense G Plaintiffs Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense H Profit and Loss Statement for OTC Group 1 /1 /13-6/15/16 Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense I Balance Sheet for OTC Group as of 12/15/14 Admitted 10/18/16 
Defense J Deposition of Jill Johnson Admitted 10/18/16 
Exhibit List 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
SCOTT H. LEE, an individual, DRUG 
TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, VURV, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
BOW. and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a 
married couple, 
Defendants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44791 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
JAMES F. JACOBSON 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: MARO 2 2017 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MICHELLE R. POINTS 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and 
TESSA COUSINS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID CROSSETT, an individual, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
SCOTT H. LEE, an individual, DRUG 
TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, VURV, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
BOW. and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a 
married couple, 
Defendants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44791 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
27th day of January 2017. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
